LAST WEEK'S KEY FACTORS AND MAIN TRENDS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND UKRAINE
(March 20–26, 2017)
I. Major-Profile Events in the Development of the Situation around Ukraine
An analysis of the development of the situation in the world, in Europe and around Ukraine, allows us to conclude that a new, more acute and conflict-dangerous stage of the confrontation between Russia and the West has begun. The reason for this is tougher actions by the USA, NATO and the EU to contain Russia in all directions, which actually “drives” V. Putin's regime into a “dead end” of critical problems for it. In such circumstances, the leadership of the Russian Federation is going to direct military blackmail of the United States and Europe, including in the nuclear sphere.
The consequence of this trend is an increase in the confrontation of the parties actually to the level of a new “cold war” with the real danger of their armed confrontation. First of all, it concerns Central-Eastern Europe (including Ukraine), as well as the Black Sea and Baltic regions, where the interests of Russia and the West directly overlap. It is in these regions that the main military activity of the Russian Federation and the USA/NATO is observed.
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Thus, in the second half of March 2017, a complex of operational and combat trainings was conducted in the Russian Armed Forces against the single operational background, with mastering the scenario of a full-scale military conflict between Russia and Ukraine and NATO on the South-Western strategic direction (in the Black Sea region). As during the “Kavkaz-2016” exercise, the scenario envisaged two options, namely: repulsion of Ukraine's possible attempt with the support of NATO to regain control over the Crimea, and conducting a full-scale offensive operation to create a land corridor from Russia to the Crimea and Trans-Dniester.
The troops of the Southern Military District of the RF Armed Forces (including those stationed in the occupied Crimea), as well as separate formations and units of the Western and Central Military Districts, the Aerospace Forces (VKS), Airborne Forces (VDV), the Strategic Missile Forces and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.
The complex of the trainings included: testing the combat readiness of the troops of the Southern Military District, the 4th (headquarters in Rostov-on-Don) and the 14th (headquarters in Yekaterinburg) Air Force and Air Defense Armies; tactical trainings of some formations of the 1st Tank and 20th Combined-Arms Armies of the Western Military District; combat patrolling the mobile missile systems “Topol-M” and “Yars” from the Strategic Missile Forces; joint trainings of units of Airborne Forces, VKS and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the occupied Crimea.
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Landing operation from the Russian BDK “Caesar Kunikov” at the Opuk Range in the occupied Crimea |
The exercises in the Crimea were held on 17–23 March 2017 at the Opuk training grounds and in other parts of the Peninsula with the participation of battalion tactical groups (BTG) from the 7th Airborne Assault Division (Novorossiysk), the 56th (Kamyshin) and 11th (Ulan-Ude) Airborne Assault Brigades. The forces and means of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army were also involved. In total, more than 2,500 paratroopers and about 600 units of combat and special equipment took part in the exercises.
The scenario of the exercises included repulsion of an enemy attack on the Crimea (including the capture of the Kerch crossing) with the help of naval and airborne assault forces, subversive and reconnaissance groups. Proceeding from the above-mentioned, fulfillment of the following tasks was mastered: creation of a group of rapid reaction troops to strengthen the Russian Armed Forces in the Crimea; organization of anti-landing defense in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet; destruction of the enemy in the Crimea with the support of the VKS aviation; liquidation of sabotage and reconnaissance groups; defense of designated lines and areas; control of important objects.
In this aspect, the main elements of the exercises were: alerting the airborne troops and transferring three battalion tactical groups to the Crimea using road, rail, air and sea transport (at the preparatory stage of the exercises — from 13 to 19 March); landing of sea and airborne assault forces (including BTG of the 7th Airborne Assault Division from the board of the large landing ship “Caesar Kunikov” and BTG of the 11th and 56th Airborne Assault Brigades from aircraft and helicopters); conducting defensive and offensive actions (during the main stage of the exercises — from March 20 to 23).
At the same time, the Russian Federal Security Service's Border Guard troops were conducting an anti-terrorist exercise in the Crimea. Under the scenario, a group of terrorists seized a ship and hostages from the ship's crew, and then went to sea to carry out a terrorist attack on one of the gas production platforms of “Chernomorneftegaz” (in 2014 they were captured by Russia from Ukraine). In response, a special unit of the border guards conducted an anti-terrorist operation to neutralize terrorists and release hostages. At this, a direct deployment was carried out onto the captured ship from helicopters, and an assault group boarded it from the boats.
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Cadets from the Ukrainian Naval Academy visiting Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 (SMNCMG2) in port of Odesa |
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At the same time, within the framework of implementation of the North Atlantic Alliance's leadership's political decisions on the NATO's permanent naval presence in the Black Sea Region, six warships of the NATO member countries entered the Black Sea. The US Navy's “Carter Hall” (with the Marine Expeditionary Battalion on board), France's “La Fayette” missile frigate, as well as the units of the 2nd Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 (SMNCMG2) consisting of the multitask support ship of the Polish Navy “ORP K.X. Czernicki” and the naval minesweepers “ESPS Duero” (Spain), “FGS Rottweil” (Germany) and the “TCG Alanya” (Turkey).
With the participation of the NATO’s SMNCMG2 in the Western part of the Black Sea there was exercise of minesweepers, after which the ships entered the port of Odesa. At the same time, the USS “Carter Hall” took part in the “Spring Storm–2017” exercise in Romania.
II. Russia's Armed Aggression against Ukraine
2.1. The East of Ukraine (The ATO zone)
Russia's actions in the conflict zone in the Donbas fully correspond to the policy of the Kremlin, which seeks to strengthen military pressure on Ukraine and its Western partners by actively shelling the ATO forces' positions and civilian settlements with the involvement of Russian-terrorist forces.
By decision of the Military Command of the Russian Federation, the number of personnel of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Armed Forces in the occupied territories of Ukraine is increasing to 50,000 men. For this purpose, the DPR and LPR have started mobilizing about 10,000 reservists from among the local population under the age of fifty.
Against this background, V. Putin's regime continues to demonstrate its possible recognition of the “DPR” and “LPR”. Thus, on 20 March 2017, under the auspices of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the Livadia Palace in the Crimea hosted a forum on the “Further Fate of the Donbas”. The event was attended by deputies of the State Duma, “leaders” of the “DPR” and “LPR”, representatives of the occupation authorities of the Crimea. The main theme of the forum was the discussion of the prospects of the self-proclaimed republics' integration into Russia.
At the same time, the State Duma of the Russian Federation is considering a possibility of simplifying the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship by residents of the “DPR” and “LPR”, providing a number of other benefits, in particular, permission to reside in Russia, registering and obtaining the right to work.
2.2. The Crimean Peninsula
A characteristic feature of the situation around the Crimea is the indisputable change in the attitude of the Russian leadership and Russian society to the question of Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Thus, V. Putin refused to participate in public events dedicated to the celebration of the 3rd anniversary of the event. The reason may be the President's reluctance to associate himself with the Crimean issue because of the obvious failure of his hopes for the possibility of international recognition of the Peninsula's “belonging to Russia”, and also because of the negative consequences from the seizure of the Crimea. The fact of such consequences was first time recognized at the official level by the Press Secretary of the Russian President D. Peskov.
Tatarstan's authorities (who acted as one of the main channels of the Kremlin's influence on the Crimean Tatars) also refused to celebrate the 3rd anniversary of this annexation. Instead of the action in support of “the Crimea's joining Russia”, in the center of Kazan there was an allowed by the authorities meeting of clients of “Tatfondbank” and “Intekhbank” that had suffered from bankruptcies of these financial institutions. Earlier, the head of Tatarstan R. Minnikhanov openly opposed the withdrawal of part of the republic's income in favor of the Crimea.
2.3. Other Aspects of the Russian Federation's Actions against Ukraine and the West
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Russian President V. Putin at a meeting with the Senior Command of the RF security services, March 23 |
In order to demonstrate its military might, Moscow continues to build up the combat potential of the Russian Armed Forces. According to Russian President V. Putin at the meeting with the Senior Command of the Russian security services on March 23, the main priority in the sphere of military development of the country remains strengthening of the strategic nuclear component of the Russian Army and Navy. Thus, by the end of 2020, it is planned to increase the share of new weapons systems in the Strategic Nuclear Forces to 60 %, and by certain parameters — to 90 %.
As part of the practical implementation of such plans, the rearmament of the 39th Missile Division (headquarters — Novosibirsk) of the 33rd Rocket Army (RA) of the Strategic Missile Forces with new “Yars” mobile missile systems will be completed by the end of this year. The development and adoption of new missile systems will continue, including the RS-28 “Sarmat” ICBM. Controlling the implementation of these plans, last week Russian Defense Minister S. Shoigu made an inspection trip to the Siberian region of the Russian Federation and visited the headquarters and units of the 33rd RA.
The combat power of general-purpose forces playing a key role in ground operations is also increasing. Thus, the arsenals of the ground forces will be replenished with modern tanks based on the “Armata” and “Kurganets” platforms, self-propelled artillery systems “Koalitsia SV”.
The Russian military command reinforces the naval component of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This year the Black Sea Fleet will receive three more submarines of Project 636.3 (carriers of cruise missiles “Kalibr”) — “Krasnodar”, “Kolpino” and “Velikiy Novgorod”. Since 2015, the Black Sea Fleet has already received three similar submarines — “Novorossiysk”, “Rostov-on-Don” and “Stary Oskol”. In Sevastopol, the submarine “ALROSA” is being repaired.
Preparations are continuing for a strategic command and staff exercise “West-2017”, which will be held in the Belarusian and Russian territories on 14–20 September 2017. President of Belarus A. Lukashenko on 20 March 2017 approved the intent of this exercise. According to him, 3 thousand Russian servicemen, about 280 combat vehicles, up to 30 aircraft and helicopters will take part in the training of the elements of the exercise directly on the territory of Belarus. A similar number of servicemen will participate from the Belarusian Armed Forces. In total, according to the official sources of Belarus and Russia, up to 13,000 servicemen will participate in the West-2017 exercise (the events on the Russian territory included).
Let us point out that Russia is strengthening economic pressure on Ukraine. March 22, 2017, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a bill prohibiting money transfers from Russia to Ukraine using foreign payment systems. The decision was taken in response to the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of March 15, 2017 on sanctions against Russian financial institutions operating in Ukraine.
III. Ukraine, International Organizations and Leading Western Countries
In the situation of Russia's using new forms of putting pressure, it is extremely important for Ukraine to be supported by international organizations and Western countries.
3.1. International Organizations
The European Union. During the latest meeting of the Parliamentary Committee of the Association between Ukraine and the EU on 15 March 2017 in Strasbourg, the representatives of the European Parliament condemned Russia's violation of human rights in the Crimea and the Donbas, and expressed the European Parliament's firm positions on the all-round assistance to the measures of the European Union concerning the support of Ukraine in the political and economic spheres (including the promotion of Ukrainian goods to the European market).
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On 25 March the EU leaders signed the Rome Declaration |
March 25, 2017, according to the results of the European Union's summit in Rome on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the EU, the leaders of the European Union signed a political Declaration (called the “Rome Declaration”), which determines the Organization's development strategy for the future. According to the document, the main efforts of the EU will be aimed at building a safe and secure Europe, strengthening the unity of the European Union and its positions on the global scene, economic prosperity of European countries, and ensuring high social standards. At the same time, despite the different levels of development of European countries and certain differences in their interests, an opinion was voiced about the possibility of “multi-speed” integration of the member countries of the European Union.
NATO. March 20, 2017, during the meeting of the NATO Committee on Partnership and Collective Security, discussion was devoted to further providing assistance to Ukraine in strengthening the defense sphere, bringing it to the standards of the North Atlantic Alliance. The NATO leadership expressed its firm intention to continue this consistent work.
The strengthening of NATO's military presence in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states is also continuing. In particular, on 20 March 2017 a unit of the French Armed Forces with 50 servicemen arrived in Estonia and will be part of the Alliance's multinational battle group in Estonia. Earlier (March 17), a British military unit with 130 troopers arrived in Estonia. By April 2017, another three groups of servicemen from Great Britain, France and Denmark, as well as combat and special equipment will be sent to Estonia. March 23, 2017, more than 100 soldiers from the Netherlands arrived in Lithuania. As part of the multinational NATO battle group, there are already 400 German soldiers and 100 Belgian soldiers in Lithuania.
3.2. Leading Western Countries
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General Curtis Scaparrotti, U.S. European Command/Supreme Allied Commander, testifies of the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 23 |
The USA. The US military leadership confirms its perception of Russia as of one of its main opponents. According to the Commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM)/NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, General C. Scaparotti's statement at the Senate hearings in the US Congress, the new EUCOM operational plan for the first time in 25 years provides for repulsion of the possible aggression of Russians. This was justified by the aggressiveness of Moscow's policy, which creates an immediate threat to the security of the Western world.
C. Scaparotti pointed out the need to maximize the support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, leading a tough fight with Russia. Therefore, the American General spoke in favor of giving lethal weapons to Ukraine.
The FRG. In contrast to Moscow's attempts to undermine the unity of the EU, the FRG's political forces are in favor the strengthening of the European Union. March 19, 2017, in Frankfurt am Main, Munich, Hamburg, Dresden, Leipzig, Wiesbaden, Dusseldorf and other cities of Germany, mass rallies were held in support of the united and democratic Europe on the eve of the elections in France and Germany. The public movement “Pulse of Europe”, which opposes the spread of populism and Russian influence in the countries of the European Union, initiated the action.
France. The leadership of France demonstrates solidarity with Ukraine in the issue of the annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea by Russia. March 21, 2017, France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a special statement in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity and condemnation of the actions of V. Putin's regime to seize the Crimea. Concern was expressed about the militarization of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, as well as the violation of the rights of the Crimean Tatars.
The Netherlands. According to the final results of the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, held on 15 March 2017, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), led by Prime Minister M. Rutte, won. The Dutch experts believe that the VVD will be able to form a parliamentary coalition with parties of a similar orientation, advocating strengthening of the United Europe. So, Russia's efforts to strengthen its positions in Europe by supporting populist political forces with a radically nationalistic, Euro-skeptical and pro-Russian orientation turned out to be in vain. The victory in the parliamentary elections of the VVD determines the favorable prospect for ratification by the Upper House of the Parliament of the Netherlands (Senate, tentatively in April of this year) of the Agreement on the Ukraine–EU Association.
ІV. Other Important Trends and Developments that Will Have an Impact on Ukraine's National Interests
Against the background of the events discussed above, a new significant problem in the implementation of the Kremlin's neo-imperial policy is the spread of protest activity in Russia, which is accompanied by protests of the opposition in Belarus, which is the main ally of the Russian Federation.
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Arrest of “Freedom Day” participant in Minsk, March 25 |
Belarus. March 25, 2017, a meeting was held in the center of Minsk dedicated to the “Freedom Day” — the anniversary of the proclamation of independence of the Belarusian People's Republic, which this year is accompanied by a month-long protests against the so-called “Tax on Parasites”. The meeting in Minsk was held without the participation of opposition leaders. Several thousand citizens took part in it, and they did not manage to gather in one column because of the siloviki's actions. The slogans of the participants included the following demands: to restore democratic freedoms in the country; to establish social and economic guarantees for all citizens; to cancel the recently adopted law on the collection of the tax on “parasitism”.
Minsk meeting was brutally dispersed by Belarusian security forces. According to different sources, 700 to 1,000 people were arrested, including 30 journalists. To justify such actions, Belarusian President A. Lukashenko accused the USA and Germany of preparing armed provocations on the Belarusian territory, including by financing extremists through non-governmental foundations in Poland and Lithuania. Earlier, A. Lukashenko had already reported on the “training of militants in the camps on the territory of Ukraine to participate in actions to destabilize Belarus”.
Despite this, on 26 March 2017, in October Square in Minsk, as well as in Brest and Bobruisk, new protest actions took place against the arrests of participants of the rally dedicated to “Freedom Day”. In response, Belarusian authorities continued their repression against the opposition. All in all, about 100 people were detained on that day, including human rights activists and journalists.
The United States and the European Union condemned the actions of the Belarusian authorities (regarding to them as a violation of democracy and freedom of speech) and demanded the release all the detainees.
A characteristic feature of the meetings held in Minsk — they took place on the eve of mass protests in Russia.
Russia. March 26, 2017, in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Kemerovo, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Barnaul, Tomsk, Orenburg, Belgorod, Tambov, Krasnodar, Makhachkala and other (about 100) Russian cities, mass protests were held under the slogans “Russia against Putin” and “Down with the Corrupt Officials from the Russian Government”. The initiator and organizer of the actions were the opposition Progress Party and the Anti-Corruption Foundation headed by A. Navalny.
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Arrest of an anti-corruption march participant in Moscow, March 26 |
In Moscow, the anti-corruption march (attended by more than 25,000 people) was dispersed by the police with the use of force, stun grenades and tear gas. About 700 participants of the action were detained, including A. Navalny and all the staff of the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Similar methods were used by the Russian authorities in Vladivostok, Novosibirsk and Krasnodar. In contrast to St. Petersburg (up to 10,000 people took part in the action), where the police withdrew and did not actually create obstacles to the meeting.
Russia's Economy. The results of the functioning of the Russian economy for January–February of this year refute the statements by the Russian leadership about the alleged “Russia's adaptation to Western sanctions”. Thus, according to Rosstat, during the first two months of 2017, the industrial production index fell by 0.3 %, although the Russian government hoped for its growth (1.6 % in 2016) as a “locomotive” of restoration of the positive dynamics of the country's development. According to experts, the reason for the fall of this indicator is the loss of the Russian businesses' hope for the USA and EU's cancelling their sanctions against Russia. But this did not happen, which markedly reduced investment in the Russian economy. In addition, since February 2017, the prices for oil have again been falling, which is one of the main factors influencing the economic situation in Russia.
Despite the Kremlin's statements concerning “the population's real income's growth”, Rosstat acknowledged a decrease in this indicator by 4.1 % compared to January–February 2016. All this testifies to the effectiveness of the so-called “Anaconda” plan, which is being implemented by the West for economic pressure on Russia.
V. Major Trends in the Development of the Situation around Ukraine in the Future
5.1. Key Events and Trends that Will Be Most Important for Ukraine
The aggravation of the confrontation between Russia and the West once again demonstrates that the regime of V. Putin will not be able to realize its plans for Ukraine. In other words, there will be no compromise with the USA and EU on the Ukrainian issue.
In such a situation, we should expect Russia's further building up pressure on Ukraine to force it to the Russian conditions for a “settlement” of the conflict in the Donbas. At the same time, Moscow will not give up its possible demonstrative recognition of the “DPR” and “LPR”. In particular, in April of this year, as part of the adoption of legislative acts by the State Duma of the Russian Federation on simplifying the procedure for granting Russian citizenship to residents of the former Soviet republics, quite possibly it may adopt a number of preferences for the population of the occupied territories of the Ukrainian Donbas. As was observed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia can begin preparations for signing bilateral agreements with self-proclaimed republics in the East of Ukraine in the economic and then in the political spheres.
At the same time, the beginning of mass protests in Russia from the end of March this year may become a new problematic aspect in the implementation of the Kremlin's plans for Ukraine. At this, the main centers of protest activity are Moscow and southern regions of the country, located in close proximity to the occupied territories of the Donbas. Thus, since March 27, 2017, there are planned to be new actions by opposition forces in Moscow under the slogans of combating corruption, marches of farmers and truck drivers from the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories to the capital of the Russian Federation. A separate problem zone is the western regions of the Rostov region, where protests of Russian miners continue. Since the Kremlin uses the habitual practice of forcibly solving problems with any of its opponents, this situation can lead to unrest in both the Russian capital and the south of Russia — in fact, in the rear zone of Russian troops in the East of Ukraine.
The activity of Islamic extremists in the North Caucasus of the Russian Federation also has become more active. March 24, 2017, militants of the Caucasian section of the “Islamic State” attacked the military base of the Russian National Guard in the Naur district of Chechnya, where six Russian servicemen were killed and several were injured. The attack was committed to the 140th Artillery Regiment of the 46th Separate Operational Brigade, participating in Russia's combat actions in Syria.
In general, these facts are enough to conclude: the situation in Russia is getting destabilized, which in some way distracts the Putin regime's attention and resources from Ukraine. And the attack on the military base of the Russian National Guard in Chechnya just before the beginning of mass protests of Russians confirms the purposeful and organized nature of the actions of certain forces to provoke unrest in the Russian Federation.
5.2. Prospects for the Development of Events in the Conflict Zones in Ukraine
The intensification (since the beginning of February of this year) of fighting in the Donbas did not allow Moscow to achieve its goal in relation to Ukraine. The conflict drags on, and Western sanctions against Russia are not canceled. Obviously, it should be assumed that the Kremlin will resort to other forms of influence on Ukraine.
One of such forms may be an increase in terrorist activity, both in the rear zone of the ATO and in the rest of Ukraine. Russia will try to damage our military potential, sow panic in the Ukrainian society, show “the Ukrainian authorities' incapability of ensuring security in the country”.
An example of Moscow's policy of state terrorism against Ukraine is the murder in Kyiv on March 23 of the ex-Deputy of the State Duma of Russia from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation D. Voronenkov, who at the end of last year moved to Ukraine, was granted Ukrainian citizenship and was to testify in the case of high treason of the former Ukrainian President V. Yanukovych. This murder is a continuation of the consistent actions of V. Putin's regime to eliminate witnesses of its crimes against Ukraine. This topic becomes especially relevant for the Kremlin in the context of the consideration by the UN International Court of Justice of Ukraine's claim against Russia and the demonstration by Western special services of the possibility of blocking accounts of the Russian tops abroad. Recent publications in the European and American media of schemes of illegal withdrawal of funds from the Russian Federation with mentioning specific banks in countries, both of the former USSR and of the European Union, are convincing enough about this. In the context of Russia's possible terrorist attack against Ukraine is seen the explosion of ammunition at warehouses in Balaklia of the Kharkov region.
At this, the scale and nature of the operational and combat training of the Russian Armed Forces, including in the occupied Crimea, show that Moscow is ready to resume a military offensive in the East of Ukraine in order to seize Mariupol, to reach the western borders of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, and in the long term — to create a land corridor in the direction of the Crimean Peninsula and Trans-Dniester.
Another goal of Russia's active hostilities in the Donbas may be to divert attention of Russian citizens from domestic problems in the country, as well as to justify the harsh actions of law enforcement agencies to suppress protest actions of the opposition.
5.3. Other Important Events that Will Have an Impact on Ukraine's Interests and Security
According to the representative of the International Monetary Fund G. Rice, in the near future the IMF Board of Directors will again consider plans for further implementation of the expanded financing program for Ukraine (in particular, the allocation of the next tranche of the financial loan to Ukraine in the amount of 1 billion US dollars). The meeting of the IMF leadership on this issue was to be held on March 20 this year, but it was postponed to assess the problems associated with the blockade of Ukraine's transport communication with the occupied areas of the Donbas. Despite the decision of the IMF, March 24, 2017, the EU Delegation to Ukraine expressed the European Union's firm intention to provide Ukraine with a second tranche of macro-financial assistance in the amount of 600 million Euros.
Special attention should be paid to events of a global and regional scale that will undoubtedly affect both the interests and the security of Ukraine in the near future, namely:
May 25, 2017 — NATO summit at the new headquarters in Brussels (US President D. Trump is expected to participate within the framework of his first foreign visit);
July 7-8, 2017 — Summit of the leaders of the G20 member countries in Hamburg;
June 2017 — anniversary Summit of the BSEC (on security issues in the Black Sea region) in Istanbul.
