March 19, 2014

Perspectives of the “Crimean Party” for “the Kremlin chess-player”

As the Ukrainian society was told by one of the highly informed apologists of the Mezhyhiryan dictator, the latter was characterized by a number of social adaptation (post-criminal) and social-everyday (“royal”) complexes, caused by his “hard childhood”. Leading the country, which has never been home to him, he stubbornly led it to decay and decline, to the loss of its sovereignty. He was stopped by his own People.

The threat of the return of Ukraine to signing an Association Agreement with the EU, made the Kremlin strategists to go from the scenario “A” (political and economic forcing Yanukovych to join the Kremlin's Eurasian project) to scenarios “B” (annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol on the “request” of the Russian-speaking population, which is allegedly oppressed) and “C” (expansion of the annexed territories through South-Eastern regions for the same formal reason).

This aggressive attitude of Putin (but not of Russia!) can be explained by his fourteen-year evolution in power, and there are no grounds at all that he will come to his senses. We'll explain this schematically.

Global aspirations of the President of the Russian Federation during this period were the resumption of Russia's status as one of the global centers of power, reintegration of Ukraine or its part into the Eurasian project of the Kremlin, breakthrough of the sanitary border (NATO) around Russia and avoiding strategic convergence of Kiev with the EU and NATO, free access to the Ukrainian market, resources and industrial potential, as well as demonstration to post-Soviet authoritarian regimes of determination and willingness of Russians to counteract by any means any attempts of their democratic destruction.

Practice of the domestic, foreign and military policy of the ruler of Russia during his first and second, so-called “prime minister's” third and, obviously, his fourth presidential terms has been and will be devoted to:

  • Exclusive strengthening of his personal power and expanding his powers (overcoming governor Fronde, creation of federal districts and pseudo-opposition parliamentary parties, full control of both chambers of Federal Assemblies, ready to legitimize the use of the Russian Armed Forces abroad, and such like);
  • Economic (customs union/single economic space, Eurasian economic union) and ideological justification of neo-imperial ambitions (“Russian world”, “worldwide Orthodoxy”, Eurasianism), camouflaged under integration projects.

The Kremlin's plans included and include its willingness to provide military and political response to an “appeal” of regional authorities of neighboring (and not only neighboring) countries for protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population, which will provide “adequate support by the limited military contingent of the Russian Federation Armed Forces”. Georgia and Ukraine have seen this and the inadequacy of the reaction of the Moscow regime, ready even to shed blood of “fraternal peoples”.

Moreover, the Kremlin power, happy with the “Crimean success”, is ready to export, and its propaganda — to popularize and promote separatism/federalism not only in Ukraine, but also in Scotland, Ireland, Catalonia, Switzerland, Belgium, and Moldova…

As the impartial analysis shows, the son of Leningrad (not St. Petersburg) marginal suburbs suffers Yanukovych's phobias and complexes in hypertrophied form. Together with Ukraine and the world community, his own people have to “help him leave”.

In this case, the irrational fear of individual countries and business circles in relation to Putin must be replaced with coordinated offensive in all directions in order to destroy the political, economic and humanitarian foundation of Putin's regime and to encourage the Russian establishment and Russian citizens to search for other, non-military forms of response to global, regional and national challenges and threats to the Russian society.