Vadym Volokhov
Is the Question of Kurdistan's Independence Closed? Part 2
Is the Question of Kurdistan's Independence Closed? Part 1
Turkey
Ethnic Kurds comprise a significant proportion of the Turkish population — about 18 %. Kurds live throughout of all Turkey, but most are in the East and South-East of the country.
The Turkish concept of security focuses on the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK) and the suppression of any Kurdish movement towards autonomy.
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“Kurdistan Workers' Party” (Kurdish: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane — PKK, since April 4, 2002 — “Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress”, KADEK) — a Kurdish political organization founded on November 27, 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist (with a Maoist orientation) underground group. |
Note:In the years 1978–1980, the PKK was distinguished mainly by actions against the Kurdish nationalist parties (”reactionary” from its point of view) and “feudal lords” (representatives of spiritual and secular traditional Kurdish elites), which gave rise to suspicions that the party was created by the Turkish special services. After the 1980 military coup in Turkey, almost all party leaders were arrested, but Abdullah Ocalan (nickname “Apo”, Kurdish: “Uncle”) and a number of party members managed to escape to Syria, where they were taken under wing of Syrian special services. The PKK created its headquarters in the Beqaa Valley (Lebanon) and has been trained in the Palestine Liberation Organization's camps. The motto of the party was to create a “united, independent, democratic Kurdistan”.
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| Abdullah Ocalan at the PKK training camp in Lebanon, 1992 |
In 1984, the PKK declared war on the Turkish government. The first PKK's action was capturing by guerrilla groups (August 15, 1984) of the town of Eruch, and since then, the organization has been conducting a continuous armed struggle. The PKK focuses mainly on guerrilla warfare tactics. The party's combat units participate in clashes with Turkish army and police forces, aiming to control the cities and villages inhabited by Kurds in the territory of south-eastern Turkey.
The military confrontation between the Turkish state and the PKK has resulted in the deaths of more than 40 thousand people and the forced resettlement of hundreds of thousands more. The armed conflict has made even greater the gap between the Kurds, on the one hand, and the Turkish state, on the other. However, about half of the 15-million Kurds living in Turkey, especially representatives of the religious community and integrated in Turkish society Kurds, traditionally support the government in Ankara.
In the 1990s, A. Ocalan's supporters already had a multithousand partisan army called “Kurdistan National Liberty Army” (Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan, ARGK) and branched-out political structures united into the “National Liberation Front of Kurdistan” (Eniya Rizgariya Neteweyî ya Kurdistanê, ERNK). The army consisted of professional guerrillas, with well-equipped bases in hard-to-reach high mountain areas.
The PKK's political structures tightly controlled the Kurdish society both in Turkey itself and in the European diaspora, collecting tribute from all Kurdish businessmen and severely (up to murder) putting an end to any dissent. As a result, the PKK had a large budget, which was managed through businessmen controlled by the party. There is also information on the party's involvement in drug trafficking. The main military targets were government security forces in Turkey, but the PKK was also active in Western Europe, acting against Turkish facilities.
The PKK attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial institutions in many countries of Western Europe in 1993 and in spring 1995. In an attempt to undermine the tourism industry in Turkey, the PKK bombed tourist facilities and kidnapped foreign tourists; however, it seldom and inconsistently acted against the tourism industry, and the methods of “blind terror” with mass casualties among the civilian population were not used by the party.
The popularity of the PKK is due to the deep Kurdish patriotism and the sense of national humiliation and inequality of the Kurds in Turkey, but the ideology and practice of the party are clearly totalitarian in nature.
In 1998, the PKK lost its support from Syria, and shortly thereafter, on the orders of the arrested A. Ocalan, it stopped a war, but in 2005–2006, fighting was restored. At this, the PKK's main camps are located in Iraqi Kurdistan and the party is in ambiguous relations with US military and local Kurdish authorities. In Iraqi Kurdistan, it is believed that the military campaigns that are periodically resumed by the PKK in Turkey are in fact the actions of Turkey's special services to have an excuse for sending troops into the territory of the Kurdish autonomy.
The PKK stopped calling for creation of an independent Kurdish state more than ten years ago and now seeks for broader cultural, language and political rights. In the words of the PKK itself, this “struggle” includes women's rights, human rights, environmental protection and “democratic autonomy” — a basic form of government that is seen as a model for the entire Middle East.
The legal pro-Kurdish “People's Democratic Party” (HDP) is the third-largest party in the Turkish parliament. It also advocates broad cultural, language and political rights through appropriate amendments to the constitution of the state. Due to the HDP's political position, it is accused of being the PKK's legal front. Since the failed military coup in Turkey in July 2016, several HDP MPs were arrested, more than 80 mayors of cities (members of the party) were removed from power and replaced by officials loyal to the government, and thousands of members of the HDP were arrested.
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| Votes for the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in the 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey |
Speaking about Ankara's attitude to the question of the independence of the Kurds, several facts should be kept in mind.
Firstly, in recent years, the Iraqi Kurdistan has become Ankara's important economic partner. This was due to the Turkish businesses' quite large investments into the Kurdish autonomy and the growing energy needs of Turkey. In 2013, an agreement was signed between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan on the direct export of hydrocarbons to Turkey without the consent of Baghdad, which very much infuriated the latter.
Secondly, it is desirable to bear in mind that there are insurmountable political differences between the “Kurdistan Workers' Party” (PKK) and M. Barzani's “Kurdistan Democratic Party” (KDP): the PKK was created by Turkish Marxists whose views have not changed much and the party remains a “secular party of the left orientation”, and the KDP has always been a feudal-clan structure of M. Barzani.
The PKK and the KDP are rivals in a constant fight for leadership in the Kurdish region, which has been considerably aggravated since the early 2000s. Both parties have created their branch organizations, through which they spread their influence on the Kurds all over the world.
Syria
There are 3.8–4 million Kurds, mostly Kurmanji, in the north-eastern part of the country. “Syrian Kurdistan” is an unofficial name (usually Kurds call it “Western Kurdistan”), which is also used for territories inhabited by Kurds and related to Kurdistan.
In the north-eastern part of the country, the Kurds inhabit most of al-Hasakah Province. The main cities in this region are Qamishli and al-Hasakah. Other regions with a significant Kurdish population are Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) in the northern part of Syria near Jarabulus, and the city of Afrin and its outskirts along the Turkish border. The provisional capital is the city of Qamishli.
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| Western (Syrian) Kurdistan |
Many Kurds seek political autonomy for Kurdish settlements in Syria, similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan in Iraq, or full independence as part of a single Kurdish state. Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, government troops have left most the territory inhabited by Kurds, which resulted in a political vacuum that the Kurds filled with their autonomous control.
In the history of the Kurdish people, Syrian Kurds were the most rightless and historically it happened so that they were also the most peaceful. From the 1980s to the late 1990s, the PKK had been operating from Syria and Lebanon with the support of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Syria expelled the PKK from its territory in 1998 after Turkey threatened it with an invasion. Thereafter relations between Ankara and Damascus had been improving until 2011, when a civil war began in Syria and the country actually fell apart.
Turkey supported various groups of Syrian rebels, first to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and then to fight against the Syrian Kurds and prevent the latter from achieving independence. Besides, Ankara's attempt to eliminate the dangers on its borders with Syria is of great importance.
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| The “Democratic Union Party” (PYD) has an armed wing — “People's Protection Units” (YPG), which are closely linked to the “Kurdistan Workers' Party” (PKK) |
With the onset of the civil war, the Syrian Kurds won several military victories and founded three autonomous regions. The “Democratic Union Party” (PYD) is the most influential political party among the Syrian Kurds. It was founded in 2003 on the instructions of the Turkish PKK, which wanted to have a secular sister organization in Syria. The PYD also has an armed wing — “People's Protection Units” (YPG), which are closely linked to the PKK. They are fighting in northern Syria and are considered an important partner of the Coalition led by the United States, which continues to fight the ISIS, about a “complete victory” over which Russia announced a few months ago. The YPG now controls a significant part of the Syrian border with Turkey. In the autumn of 2014, in the Battle for Syrian Kobani, the YPG fighters, who were supported by the International Coalition, managed to clear the city from the ISIS.
Led by the PYD and its armed wing — YPG, Syrian Kurds did not join either B. Assad or the Islamist rebel groups. In fact, they had a silent understanding with the regime and focused on the struggle against Islamist forces and pro-Turkish groups. Since the Syrian regime's forces left the Kurdish region in 2012, the Syrian Kurds have actually created an autonomous zone along the entire border with Turkey. At that time, the “Kurdish Supreme Committee” (DBK) which included the PYD, and the “Kurdish National Council” (KNC) under M. Barzani's guidance, were created.
The positions of the Kurds were strengthened by Washington, which supports the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), which unites Arab and Kurdish troops the backbone of which is the PYD members. Today the SDF forces control about a quarter of Syrian territory.
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Note: In January 2014, the Kurds announced the establishment of a autonomy in the North of Syria called “Rojava” (Western Kurdistan). It includes the regions (cantons) of Jazeera, Kobani and Afrin. By the end of 2016, the Kurds had managed to carry out a number of anti-ISIS operations and to unite Kobani and Jazeera, and only Afrin was alone. Turkey could not allow the Kurds to create another potentially independent Kurdish entity on their borders and in August 2016 launched the “Euphrates Shield” Operation which lasted until March 2017. |
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| The area of the military operation “Euphrates Shield” (2016–2017) |
The authorities in Damascus could offer nothing to the Kurds, while Washington opened the possibility for the creation of the Kurdish autonomy, independent from the central government of Syria. So, the Syrian Kurds became a sort of “hostage to the situation” that Turkey and the United States created in their struggle in Syria.
Currently, there are many followers of A. Ocalan in Syria, but the main goal of the Syrian Kurds is to achieve their own interests. Some PKK units are trying to influence the situation and are fighting the ISIS on the PYD's side, but their main forces and bases are in the Iraqi Kurdistan.
Until 2016, Ankara had been maintaining ties with Syrian Kurds when it was profitable. For example, in the summer of 2013, one of the leaders of the PYD, Salih Muslim visited Istanbul, where he met with representatives of Turkish security services. At that time, Ankara's main task was to unite the Syrian opposition in order to overthrow President B. Assad, and the Kurds were their allies. Later on the situation changed, and the Kurds became enemies that “threaten the national interests” of Turkey.
The “Kurdish Supreme Committee” (DBK) had to assume the functions of the Provisional Government of the Syrian Kurdistan, but failed because of the lack of unity and willingness to compromise. The matter is that it much more in the opposition to the regime and under no circumstances would negotiate with B. Assad, and due to this became a permanent member of the Geneva process. In turn, the PYD, which had real power and influence on the Kurds, could not achieve a separate representation of the Syrian Kurds in any format of negotiations for the future of Syria. As a result of these differences, the PYD became a double target for Turkey — as a potential ally of B. Assad and as an ideological ally of the PKK.
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Note: In the territory of Syria, the following parties and organizations are active:
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Given the events of recent weeks, it can be stated with certainty that the military-political situation in Syria has largely changed. Let's consider these events in more detail:
1. The conference in Sochi, organized by Russia to “achieve peace and unity” in Syria, failed. The Kurds refused to take part in that farce. The refusal of the Syrian “moderate” opposition made that conference absolutely hopeless.
2. The USA's contingent and units of the Syrian Kurds on February 7–8, 2018 caused catastrophic losses to the units of the Russian contingent in Syria, to Russian mercenaries from the Wagner PMC and B. Assad's government troops near the city of Deir ez-Zor. At present, the Russian-Syrian forces' attack on the other back of Euphrates is virtually impossible. Moreover, on 9 February, the Kurds destroyed the Russian mercenaries' field base “Carpathians” on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the village of at-Tabiyah. This can only mean one thing: B. Assad's regime has lost the oil and gas resources, because they have passed into the hands of the Kurds. In addition, Tehran and Moscow urgently need to revise their financial strategy, because without their money injections Damascus will not last long.
Washington has made it clear that it will not leave Syria, at least in Eastern Syria it will stay for a long time. And this mean that the United States can create any Kurdish formation, and nobody could stop them from doing so. The decision will be taken exclusively in Washington.
3. February 10, an Israeli Air Force’s fighter was shot down at the border with Syria. In response, Israel reacted instantly and inflicted some massive air strikes on the Syrian air defense near the cities of Aleppo, Tiyas and Damascus. We can assume that the air defense system of Syria has ceased to exist. In addition, a blow was struck against the infrastructure of Iranian intelligence in Syria.
Conclusions
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| There are no alternatives to unity for Kurds! |
Recent developments in the Kurdish enclaves needs for the unification of all Kurds under the sole leadership of the united political council of the main Kurdish parties, taking into account the experience of the Iraqi Kurdistan and the recommendations of the leadership of that region, in favor of the entire Kurdish people, including those residing in Turkey and Iran. Centralized coordination of the strategy and tactics of all four regions of Kurdistan is extremely important. Of course, the leader of the national liberation movement should be the Iraqi Kurdistan, headed by the political leadership of that region, but it can be strengthened only by joint efforts of all.
Kurdish leaders agree that the events of October 16, 2017, when Iraq regained its control over Kirkuk and put an end to the Kurds' efforts to create an independent state, changed the situation dramatically. Yes, they say, we did not manage to create national armed forces that would be subordinated to the defense minister, to the president, rather than executing orders of their party leaders.
Today, the Kurdish leadership does not have a clear plan for the future. Leaders' statements do not make it clear whether they have drawn conclusions from previous failures, especially in 2017. So far, leaders of parties and organizations are trying to blame someone else for all the troubles. Certainly, the presence of a clear plan and a real unification of the leaders of all the political and military forces of the Kurds will inspire the Kurdish population of enclaves to win and achieve their goal: creation of an independent Kurdish state.
Kurds must understand that the West has cooperated with them for two reasons.
Firstly, fighting the ISIS with the help of the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds is much cheaper than the use of their forces. That is why, due to mutual interest, Kurdistan became the center of interests of Western powers.
Secondly, Kurdistan did not demand much from Western countries for its fight against the ISIS, and when the question of supporting the referendum on independence was raised, the hopes were so great that the West could not answer them. The West did not support the Kurds.
What do the Kurds have to do? Today, the Kurds must return to Baghdad in hope to rise again. To return in order to consolidate their positions in the Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq, and to survive in Syria. To create conditions for strengthening their positions in Turkey and Iran and to be ready to continue their struggle for independence.
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| Negotiations of the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi with Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan Nechirvan Barzani, Bagdad, January 20, 2018 |
Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has shown its willingness to begin talks with the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government. In its reply, Baghdad emphasizes the conditions under which it will negotiate with Kurds:
- transfer of all airports to the Iraqi government;
- transfer to the control of the government forces of all checkpoints at the border;
- transfer of all oil, gas fields and other mining facilities;
- transfer of control over security agencies;
- transfer of control over the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (Ministry of Defense) of the Iraqi Kurdistan;
- transfer of all remaining disputed territories;
- cancellation of the results of the September 2017 referendum.
Thus, the combination of a conflict of interests between the Kurds and the West with the internal political dysfunction has left the Kurds in a more dangerous position than ever, and the actual implementation of the conditions imposed by Baghdad will lead to the complete elimination of the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iraqi Prime Minister H. al-Abadi, during the meetings and negotiations with the Kurds, repeatedly emphasized: “Make an agreement among yourselves, then we will agree on the future of the Iraqi Kurdistan”.
There are no alternatives to unity!
