Ihor Kharchenko
Cuius regio, eius religio
Whose realm, his religion
Are there prerequisites for a religious war in Ukraine?
The initial situation
The conflict between the Ukrainian Orthodox churches and the Russian Orthodox Church is within one religious group — Orthodoxy.
A religious war, in its classical interpretation, is an armed conflict between representatives of different religious groups.
With this in mind, we can state the following — there is no reason to argue that a religious war is possible in Ukraine as a result of giving Tomos to create a local Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
What is a “religious war” in Ukraine?
The possible and rather probable inter-church confrontation, which Russian media, Russian politicians, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians interpret as a classical religious war — in fact, war of identities, not of faiths.
The Ukrainian identity came into conflict with the Russian identity long ago, evidence of this is the fact that the development of events during the Maidan of 2004 and Maidan of 2013–2014 was a complete surprise for the Russian government (despite the fact that in 2014 it was more prepared and had a much greater influence on the Ukrainian authorities).
It is necessary to take into account the fact that the main objects of influence for the Russian regime are, first of all, the Russian society (creation of the image of the “besieged fortress”) and the international community.
We may also assume that the provocation of the escalation of inter-church confrontation is the “third forces”' attempt to deeper engage Russia in its conflict with Ukraine to achieve their own geopolitical (if it is an external player) or domestic political goals (if it is a group of Russian authorities that seeks to remove Putin and his team in order to take their place).
Taking into consideration the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church is fully integrated into the system of government in Russia (the “Ministry of Putin's propaganda and agitation”), we have every reason to assert that the attempt to unleash a religious war in Ukraine is the Russian regime's special operation to destabilize the situation in Ukraine.
The prerequisites that give the Russians hope for the success of the so-called “religious war” in Ukraine
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Geopolitical situation
- the Russian-Ukrainian War in the East of Ukraine.
- the presence of an extensive network of Russian agents of influence in Ukraine.
- the high level of corruption in the Ukrainian society.
- the uncertainty of European countries' position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war.
- lack of Ukraine's strategic allies in the world.
- the Russian authorities' understanding of the fact that the UN peacekeeping forces in the East of Ukraine on Russian conditions (the other is impossible today) is a freezing of the conflict with uncertain and dangerous consequences for many years.
- some foreign players' being interested in Ukraine's being controlled and weak so that it could not transform into a regional leader.
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The pre-election situation in Ukraine
- the actual start of election campaigns in Ukraine, both presidential and parliamentary, where the main struggle will be between the groups of P. Poroshenko, Yu. Tymoshenko and pro-Russian groups.
- these elections are crucial for the pro-Russian forces, because this is their last chance for systematic revenge.
- even the minimal success of pro-Russian forces in the 2019 elections gives Russians a chance to win a few regions of Ukraine in the next local elections, which will create an opportunity to capture territories by “peaceful” methods through the creation of pro-Russian enclaves for further destabilization of the situation in Ukraine.
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The complexity of the religious “map” of Ukraine
- Orthodoxy, which is represented by a large group of smaller and larger churches.
- Catholicism represented in Ukraine by the structures of the Roman Catholic Church (with the dominant influence of the Poles) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which theoretically could also enter the local Ukrainian Church as a co-founder.
- Protestantism, which is represented by a large number of “old” and “new” Protestant churches, which constitute today a serious electoral factor on the eve of the election (they have been at least formally united under the leadership of O. Turchinov).
- Islam, which in Ukraine has long gone beyond the ethnic groups for which it was a traditional religion.
- other religious movements, which, due to the worldview and organizational crisis of traditional churches, are gaining popularity, especially among young people.
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Decreased activity of the civil society in Ukraine
- the high level of patriotism of a large part of Ukrainian society is neutralized by its disunity (organizational and ideological) and its fatigue (physical and psychological).
The factors that enable Russia to provoke a “religious war”
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The bases that can be used for this purpose:
- monasteries and churches that are under the control of the Russian Orthodox Church;
- offices of Russian companies and banks.
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Fanatics (both real and fake ones):
- there are too few fanatics in the church communities of the UOC-MP (the branch of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine) to be used in large-scale actions, but enough to sacrifice one of them to discredit Ukraine and create grounds for the use of force by Russia (such things did happen more than once in world history);
- fake “fanatics” can be either trained by Russia saboteurs, provocateurs and agitators, or hired representatives of Ukrainian and Russian criminal groups.
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The political will of the Kremlin and its high-level agents of influence in Ukraine
- Putin has such a political will, as well as a desire to weaken Ukraine as much as possible;
- top-level executives in Ukraine (Novinsky, Medvedchuk and others) are also ready, especially since they themselves live outside Ukraine (for example, in Switzerland) and are not afraid to become a victim of such a conflict if it goes out of control.
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The organizational infrastructure that can be used:
- the network of the UOC-MP;
- the network of pro-Russian parties and organizations;
- representations of Russian business.
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Finance, first of all, in cash:
- incomings from parishioners of the UOC-MP;
- financial resources of the Russian business represented in Ukraine and business structures of pro-Russian forces.
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Media support, first of all — television:
- the “Inter” TV channel;
- correspondents and ENG crews of Russian TV channels;
- newspersons and ENG crews of pro-Russian mass media from Europe and other countries of the world.
To counteract means to identify problems before they arise, not just to react to what has happened
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International community:
- supporting Ukraine's getting Tomos;
- information and organizational support for the actions of the Ukrainian civil society and government in addressing the threat of “religious war”.
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Ukrainian government:
- active work of the Ukrainian special services to identify organizers and performers, preventing conflicts and eliminating sabotage groups and putting an end to the activities of provocateurs, agitators and propagandists;
- an active information campaign both in Ukraine and abroad;
- cooperation and coordination of actions with civil society organizations and “friends of Ukraine” in the leading countries of the world.
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The society:
- mobilization (organizational);
- explanatory work at the level of communities and target groups;
- creation of a coordinative centre for improving own organizational capacity;
- creation of an anti-crisis situational group for monitoring the situation and preparing decisions for society and government;
- deployment of the network to counteract to enemy influences (as an element of the system of public security).
Given the effective interaction of the international community, Ukrainian government and Ukrainian civil society, Russia's attempt to destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine under the pretext of a “religious war” will fail, and Ukraine will take another step toward its own geopolitical subjectivity.
