Bohdan Sokolovskyi
The analysis shows that a stable independence of any country is based on three systems of “optimality”: optimal (country-specific) administrative-territorial structure, optimal economic system and optimal political system. This has been reasoned and calculated by many generations of Ukrainian statesmen.
In this context, I remember in particular a lengthy discussion with Vyacheslav Chornovil in 1993 in the city of Bonn, where Konrad Adenauer Foundation invited him, together with Igor Yukhnovskyi and Volodymyr Lanovyi; so that they spoke in German “round tables” on the newly arisen new State Ukraine. The conversation was mainly about these three “optimalities”. Much attention was also paid to mistakes and problems of introduction into the law enforcement system of Ukraine of Lviv's experience of “Municipal Squads”, creation of Ukrainian parties (there were no problems with their financing by oligarchs, for there was no such thing as oligarchs then) and creation of the Ukrainian public service.
22 years have passed since then. But we have barely begun to implement some of the above-mentioned themes. However, as the saying goes, better late than never. It is hoped that the time will come for other developments. By the way, all this had been worked out without a penny of public money: it simply did not exist, because the authors had lived in empires.
The greatest achievement for the entire period of our independence can be considered probably the fact that the Constitution of Ukraine has enshrined human rights. But are they executable...? Besides, we have been taught to ignore our own, domestic, blindly believing sweet promises, beautiful words, not to seek to analyze the actual circumstances of the case, etc.
And now some of these questions are so sharp that our country is doomed without their solutions.
The administrative-territorial system and the basis of the national security (financial and banking system and energy sector) is a separate conversation.
The position of Ukrainian activists, in particular in early 1990s, in the issue of employment (unemployment) also deserves a separate discussion. If very briefly, then:
1. It is necessary, first of all, to reform the still preserved economy of the Ukrainian SSR, redirecting it to perform urgent tasks of the independent state of Ukraine, as the Ukrainian economy should be closed as much as possible, i.e., self-sufficient. Ukraine can well do without imports, which can compete with domestic products only on market conditions.
2. Reduction, in particular, of the state apparatus, should not be a goal in itself. Although to reform (in fact — to re-create) the public service of Ukraine is a must in view of the fact that our public service is an imperial heritage. This has never been done in Ukraine, unlike in many other countries of the former so-called socialist camp. People with “soviet” mentality, mainly being part of the anti-Ukrainian “fifth column”, we will have to make redundant. But they can be cut only when there is a sufficient number of attractive jobs. And the government should be responsible (up to criminal liability) for the creation of new jobs. Otherwise, the fired professionals would join the ranks of competent domestic enemies of Ukraine. In each region (regions, districts) there should be set a threshold level of unemployment, which is formed only on the market conditions and is guided only by improving the quality of products or services.
Also it is necessary to resume the study of the theme of ethnic territories of Ukraine and the Holodomor of 1932/33 and to bring the findings to the Ukrainian people and international community. In this context, the authorities should not suppress the difference in the mentality of those for whom Ukraine is the homeland, and those for whom Ukraine is not the homeland, but just a territory. First of all I mean the descendants of those who once were brought from afar and settled in the Ukrainian lands after the extermination of the Ukrainian spirit in 1932/1933, and those that joined them. Perhaps the authorities should think about resettling Ukrainophobes into other countries? Yes, it is connected with huge problems. But it is not more difficult than resettling half a million Ukrainians in 1945-1947. And before that — millions, including, as they say, into the other world. And in their place they brought foreign citizens, including for “creation of collective farms”, industrialization, and so on. Of course, today, such processes can not take place without the USA, the EU and the main culprit — the Russian Federation. This should be preceded by many years of work with each of the parties.
Ukrainian patriots focus on the issue of decentralization of power — that is, shifting of power and responsibility off the first persons to the middle and lower levels. Almost all political forces coming to power in Ukraine since 1991 have been silent about this. Such vision of irreversible decentralization of power is the true one. Everything else is the substitution of concepts. They can be very quickly abolished.
It is no secret that in this country, like in empires, all questions (strategic, tactical and technical) are decided upon by the first person (agencies, organizations, etc.). In democratic countries, strategic, tactical and technical issues are clearly separated. In those countries, the first persons (for example, ministers, heads of services and so on) are engaged only in matters of strategy, while tactical and technical questions are solved by medium and grassroots officials. Decisions on specific spheres are also made exclusively in view of the position of the authorized specialist in this field (and never — contrary to it!). Here all decisions are taken only by the leadership and often without coordination with lower levels.
Such an approach (the shift of responsibility “top down”) would provide bringing “leadership to the people”, which, by the way, could never be in the Soviet Union. And most importantly — it would really raise the responsibility of the middle and lower levels.
This form of government would contribute to the realization also de-communization. It is no secret that, for example, in the USSR, the entire leadership of organizations or agencies was carried out by representatives of the Communist Party, not by the formal leaders. Sometimes formal leaders coordinated their solutions with the Communist Party, and the Party secretary played the role of a “supervisor”. That is, in such “democratic centralism” it was very easy to implement “Party's decisions” although often they were absurd. These individual “features” unfortunately, still exist. And in a real democracy, where it is necessary to consider the opinion of experts, this can't be — it is impossible to manage any organization or agency or country in such a way.
The shift of responsibility “top down” (decentralization) would also be a systematic mechanism in the fight against corruption and the “fifth column”, formed and secretly “sitting” in the centralized power. In the context of decentralization of power, it would not be effective. Unfortunately, for more than 24 years our country has not had an effective mechanism to deal with the “fifth column”.
In this regard, we can't help paying attention to the fact that in recent years often there are reports of an arrest or neutralizing of corrupt officials or representatives of the “fifth column”. But never, no one has analyzed if they are plenty or few! Unfortunately, all this looks like the time-tested process of justification by the “detaining authorities” of their existence.
Today the “decentralization”, in particular, of the civil service, has to be accompanied by the “deoligarchization” and the question of decent funding. Only a comprehensive solution of all these issues will give a chance for the development of our country. Otherwise, we are up for a collapse.
The “decentralization”, “deoligarchization” and financing of political parties deserve a special analysis. Especially — in the light of the recently adopted Law of Ukraine on State Financing of Parties, as well as trends that will shape the power of the party exclusively.
Initially, the leaders of Ukrainian independence, relying on the experience and achievements of previous generations, in particular, of the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire and Poland, believed that political parties in Ukraine, in particular, should be financed only by contributions from their members. This meant that political advertising and donations from the outside would be banned by Law. While donations of party members would be clearly limited to a small percentage of the income over a year. Apart from this, the financial activities of the party would be transparent and easily verifiable, including by state fiscal authorities. Based on the fact that a member of the party invests time, energy, intellect, etc., — for the sake of realization of the party's ideology. Therefore, the optimal financial contributions to the party are neither a priority nor some aggravating circumstance. And vice versa — they would contribute to its activities. The Ukrainian leaders of the times of the beginning of independence believed that in Ukraine would operate 5-8 political parties of the right, centrist and left-wing ideologies.
Unfortunately, the scenario of those Ukrainian leaders did not get materialized. Today there are 300 (!) parties in our country. It is no secret that all rated parties have been created and exist on the principle of “democratic centralism”, like it was in the CPSU. The head of the party is either the owner or has (formal or informal) powers from one. He determines everything: strategy, tactics, and technical issues. As a rule, the ideology of a party has only declaratory value. Such a party defends the interests of its owner or sponsor (sponsors). That is, today in Ukraine there are oligarchic parties non-transparently funded and defending the interests of the oligarchs — at best. In the worst — such parties may be used by foreign intelligence services.
Based on this, in particular, the following issues are relevant today: reduction of the number of parties, their “decentralization”, “deoligarchization”, transparency of their funding. Earlier this could be done at the stage of creation of parties, which did not happen. Then, and until now, it was almost impossible, because there was no awareness and willingness of the people and the authorities.
Very promising is the “decentralization” of parties, which could be achieved by real increasing (through statutes) of the influence and responsibilities of members and the leading bodies of the parties and significant reduction of the influence of its leadership that would only play the role of party speakers.
“Decentralization” of parties in this manner would result in the loss of interest to them by the oligarchs, which would limit their funding and, in turn, would lead to their elimination, which is very important in our case.
In many democratic countries, and now in Ukraine (with the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of the Draft Law 2123a), much hope (and not without justification) is for the state financing of parties. In this context, it might make sense through legislation to enshrine the principle of party funding only through membership fees and the state budget, as well as to ban (at least temporarily, until the complete neutralization of the oligarchs in the parties) “donations” from the outside, political advertising, etc. It is already possible to estimate that a twenty thousand party only at the expense of membership fees of 50 hryvnias per month may have the sum of 1 000 000 UAH per month, which is enough for the activities of the party and even savings for all kinds of party events, including elections. In addition to this — government funding will significantly strengthen the party. A large one — even more so. Smaller parties would get a good incentive.
Anyway, the “decentralization” of parties and their financing from contributions (as suggested by Ukrainian activists) and the state budget while banning “donations”, political advertising, and so on, — this would be a definite chance for “deoligarchization” and elimination of political corruption.
On the other hand, financing of political parties from the state budget is fraught with “conservation” of political activity. For the parties receiving government funding will do anything to prevent development of new ones.
In this respect, it seems appropriate to review the legislation and to introduce clear criteria for state funding of parties. In particular, to determine on what the amount of state funding depends. It may be appropriate to state that the state funds only those parties that do not contradict the concept of development of the Ukrainian state provide some minimum revenue from membership fees, have reached a certain minimum size and so on.
At this, it should be borne in mind that the finances for the party are important, but not only that. In this sense, I remember the first democratic elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 1990, when there were no sponsors (oligarchs). And the election campaigns of individual candidates cost them several petrol tanks to travel to a meeting with voters in his own car (if any), personal expenses and enthusiasm. This can't be even compared with current multi-million electoral budgets. On the other hand, despite the relatively small campaign expenses of candidates (or because of them), the first democratic convocation of the Verkhovna Rada was almost the most powerful of all convocations. If nothing else, it was it who declared Ukraine's statehood.
In a word, in Ukraine, like in other democracies, there should be carried out “decentralization”, “deoligarchization” and there should start transparent financing, etc. of political parties that form the government.
As you can see, the situation is very similar to the state of affairs in the Ukrainian public service. The first step in the direction of transparency of financing of political parties and their “deoligarchization” was made by a positive vote for the Draft Law 2123a. This Law is extremely positive, correct and so on. But let's face it — it is a compromise. In a different, more efficient form, the Law most likely would not pass through the Parliament. It may be a little late... But we have to admit that by itself it will change little in the political climate in Ukraine. This means that effective can only be a complete solution of all questions of party life in the situation of normal operation of the law enforcement and fiscal systems. After all, this law significantly restricts, but does not completely eliminate the oligarchs' influence on parties. In particular, it does not exclude the shadow funding.
It turns out that for the normalization of party life for the sake of the people, much has to be done by the Parliament, by parties, and by the people of Ukraine.
All the above-mentioned reforms in the party life and in the public service are systematic by nature and are the basis for all other reforms. Having carried out them, other reforms would be carried out easily, quickly and acceptably to the people. Otherwise, again, would be relevant Krylov's fable about the orchestra...
Many of those who was formed in the Soviet environment, or in respect to the Soviet system, do not agree to the above-mentioned “decentralization”. Sometimes even sincere patriots, statesmen subconsciously give preference to the Soviet experience (unbeknown to them), because it is much easier to manage when all the decisions are carried out unconditionally. This creates the illusion of full control. And it is not so important how many employees there are in this structure: a few thousands, hundreds or tens. What matters is that someone serves morning tea or coffee to the “boss”, once again reminds him of his greatness, and the funds are provided by the state. It is clear that such an agency or organization is ineffective and useless for the state and the people, and therefore can be infinitely reduced in respond to each next Komsomol Communist appeal, creating new anti-Ukrainian columns. Actually, that is why it is necessary, in particular, to create new, attractive jobs.
As mentioned above, by such considerations on decentralization, public service and financing were guided Ukrainian statesmen, inter alia, formal and informal leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine (who made a major contribution into independence) in the 1990s. In fact, they were very serious about the functions of the government — claimed that the Rukh members had no proper experience in governing the state and, therefore, “we are not going into power”. Then, unfortunately, those who claimed to have known all this were brought to power. As a result, we have an absurd country — with wealthy oligarchs and poor people.
It seems that in 2005 some leaders of the patriotic forces repeated the mistake, when the newly elected head of state, participating in the formation of the government, offered some patriots to lead a number of ministries and departments, and they did not agree because of alleged lack of experience. In fact, their motivation was different — “we do not go into the executive branch, because we are going into the Parliament.” Meaning “let someone else changes the country, I won't”.
As a result, “we have what we have”.
I would like to point out that in this material the phrase “may be” occurs several times. The explanation is simple: because no one has the unequivocal recommendation or prescription what and how to do. I would like to note that in this material several times used the phrase “may be.” The explanation is simple: because no one has the unequivocal recommendation or prescription and what to do. Therefore, in each case, there should take place detailed studies and complex solutions, taking into consideration the causes and consequences.
All this proves that without the above-mentioned systematic reforms (let's mention them again: the reform of administrative and territorial structure; economic restructuring, decentralization and deoligarchization of power and politics; optimization and transparency of funding), all other reforms will be cosmetic.
It turns out that almost everything not realized in early1990s must be started all over again. And we should be based first of all on developments of Ukrainian statesmen, not excluding the involvement of foreign experience, in such a way following Shevchenko's advice “learn a plenty of foreign, but do not forget your own”. Now, to some extent, it is easier because we have our own state.
Finally, I would like to emphasize also that in these systems or organs, without the involvement of third-party Ukrainian forces, real transformations will not be possible. Everything — conditions and criteria, ect. — should be developed by a special commission. It has to be trusted by the people of Ukraine. So, such a commission can no longer be created by the Parliament, the President of Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Perhaps — through the setting meeting.
