Zakerzonia. Part 5.
Operations of Psychological War
Psychological operations of Ukrainian rebels in the South-Eastern Poland were conducted to support the strategic goals at that territory: to keep Ukrainian ethnic character of Zakerzonia and to strengthen it as an integral part of Ukrainian lands.
The objectives for the nearest future were as follows: to enlist the support of the local population, especially Ukrainian one; to prevent deportation of Ukrainian population of Zakerzonia; to enlist support and to establish cooperation with the Polish armed anti-Communist underground; to discredit the Communist regime in the eyes of the local population and undermine peoples’ trust to it; to deprive it of the support of local people; to inspire public confidence in victory.
Ukrainian insurgents had bi-functional management of the propaganda structures: both, the OUN and UPA each had a separate vertical of propaganda subunits. In the OUN they had an adviser on propaganda on every important step of the organization structure. His responsibilities were determined by the administrative subunit of the OUN, where he worked. The UPA also had a career officer (VI Department) for each major command level. He was, first of all, responsible for the propaganda work to support UPA’s military operations.
Apart from traditional staff of the propaganda apparatus, there were also officers- educators in groups of the OUN and UPA structures. Their activity was concentrated on ideological motivation of participants of the resistance movement.
In Ukrainian rural communities of Zakerzonia barely existed a general structure that could be used with the purpose of propaganda, since all mass organizations of the time were under the control of the Communist regime of Poland. However, members of the infrastructure, a wide range of supporters, among them — community leaders (parish priests, teachers of local schools and other intellectuals and senior citizens) had been playing the role of a substitute for a mass organization.
Propaganda of the OUN and UPA was focused on the local Ukrainian population, Ukrainian insurgents, local Polish people, the Polish armed underground, legal (political) organization of Poland and members of Polish Secret Services (mainly Army units which at the time were the least ideologically educated by Communists). Besides, propaganda work was also being carried out outside the country (in the West), as far abroad as it could reach. The main role in the dissemination of propaganda information in the West played centers of political emigration in Western Europe, which became the tribune of insurgents.
The key themes used to carry out psychological operations were as follows: setting goals and aspirations of the rebels and local population (both, Ukrainian and Polish); anti-Communist propaganda; illegitimacy of the Provisional Government in Warsaw; counter-acting the resettlement program and deportation; common objectives and tasks of the Polish and Ukrainian rebel movements and the need for cooperation and mutual coordination; anticipation of a near intervention from the West and the inevitability of war between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.
The means of information dissemination were, above all, prints (leaflets, pamphlets, newspapers, underground, posters, slogans); meetings with local residents(individual or group); physical presence of insurgent groups in local communities; special tactical operations (for example, a joint attack of Polish and Ukrainian rebels at Hrubieszów in May, 1946).
Ukrainian insurgents’ psychological operations had been getting more complicated, which is usually not the case with rebels supported from abroad. Ukrainians did not have any external material support and their propaganda activity was seriously limited technically (lack of adequate radios, transmitters and limited access to publishing equipment, lack of qualified personnel, lack of local Ukrainian-language newspapers and periodicals, etc.).
There were also other difficulties: Ukrainian insurgents ethnically differed from most of the Polish population, and this situation was complicated by the age-old enmity between the two national communities.
Despite all the adverse circumstances, the propaganda campaign of the OUN-UPA did reach the desired audience. To this testifies the Ukrainian population’s active support, counter-propaganda activities of the governmental circles of Poland, as well as co-operation (although at a low level) with the Polish rebel movement.
Public support
As Ukrainian insurgents in three years of their activity in the South-East of Poland, had not been receiving any help from the outside, they completely depended on the local population’s support. An important role in this was played by the national, ethnic factor. On the one hand, insurgents had been actively supported by ethnic Ukrainians of the region, but on the other hand ethnic Poles living there had been showing equally active resistance. (This situation most clearly manifested itself in the East of Krakow province and in the South of Lublin province, where the population was ethnically mixed— the Poles and Ukrainians had been living in large separate communities next to each other). Besides, since the beginning of the Government's program of deportation, the Ukrainian population began to perceive the insurgents as defenders, and thus to better understand their motives. Thanks to the support of local residents, insurgents managed to survive and act, as well as to use a large number of bunkers, equipped in Ukrainian villages under villagers’ houses and farms. They had not been detected for a long period until the Security Forces began operations for search and combing up in rural communities. Local people had been supplying insurgents with food, important intelligence information and recruits.
But people became less supportive when they saw the hopelessness of the situation. They understood that the UPA was unable to stop the deportation and resettlement, and they also realized the closed circle of causes and effects: it was obvious that insurgency for the sake of protection of local residents and prevention of their relocation, in fact provoked even more cruel measures on the part of Security Forces and acceleration of the program of deportation.
The effectiveness of the local population’s assistance not less depended on professional and managerial capabilities of the network and infrastructure of the OUN. That is why the most important factor that led to the defeat of the Ukrainian insurgency in Zakerzonia, was deportation of the Ukrainian population from the area of their operations. This deprived the insurgents of support.
Conclusions
Before, during and after the Second World War, in Poland there were three main prerequisites for uprising. Namely:
- readiness of the population to revolt;
- presence of national leaders;
- awareness of the people of the motives of the rebels.
Readiness of the Polish population to revolt had two aspects: a) unrealized hopes of the population, and b) presence of a relatively large oppressed ethnic minority.
Nascence of the Polish armed underground and Ukrainian insurgent movement was a manifestation of this willingness to revolt.
The newly established international borders themselves were unequivocal reason for the revolt. They randomly divided ethnically related populations.
If we talk about the Ukrainian national minority in Poland, the two immediate causes had played a key role in the uprising:
a) the joint decision of the Soviet and Polish regimes to exchange ethnic minorities of their countries;
b) the presence at the territory of Ukraine of an active insurgent organization and its leadership (OUN-UPA).
The inexorable logic of the events during the uprising led to the fact that local residents provided active assistance to the insurgents, and the latter, in turn, perceived oppression of the population as their personal.
Ukrainian insurgency in the so-called Zakerzonia was using a scenario of traditional, or, as they say, "typical" uprisings. It developed gradually, by stages, from a secret organization (OUN) to a mass movement and, eventually, to armed resistance (UPA). But as the insurgency was put down, it did not manage to reach the stage of consolidation.
The structure and organization of the Ukrainian insurgent movement resembled a known scheme of rebel movements: it had political and ideological party with hierarchy and highly disciplined, which was the source of leaders and center of political control of the armed uprising; it also had a military organization of the armed rebels, formed by traditional military canons (UPA).
Strong sides of the Ukrainian insurgent movement in Zakerzonia:
- Assistance of the local Ukrainian population with which insurgents were ethnically related.
- Accordance of the movement with the aspirations of the Ukrainian population in the region and dedication to its cause.
- It had a clearly determined political program and a limited number of political and military goals.
- It had an effective organization: a political party, armed forces and infrastructure.
- It operated at a favorable for guerrilla operations territory.
- It had a good intelligence network, oriented to cooperate with the population.
- In the movement there were experienced, dedicated and disciplined fighters who were its core.
Weaknesses:
- Wrongly chosen moment for armed actions from the point of view of the conditions for the birth of the uprising, the alignment of international forces and international environment. All this made it impossible to develop the movement to its full strength.
- Unreality and inaccessibility of long-term goals (independent Ukraine), and near-term ones (to prevent the deportation of the Ukrainian minority) at the time, despite the nobility of all plans.
- Activity in the extremely unfavorable socio-political environment: Ukrainian minority — the main base of support for the insurgents — was an ethnic enclave among the predominant Polish population.
- Absence of any (material, political and moral) external support and the limited resources of the local population.
- Inconsistency, with some exceptions, (and it was not the fault of the movement) to arrange an effective collaboration and coordination of activities with the Polish anti-Communist armed underground, despite the persistent efforts of the Ukrainian side. Also, the lack of support of the local Polish population —its chauvinism and traditional hostility to Ukrainians turned out to be stronger than political pragmatism of the time (for example, the common anti-Communist position).
- Lack of safe havens in other provinces of Poland or in the neighboring Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia (the latter, like Poland, was already partially pro-Communist).
- Premature military defeat and surrender of weapons by the ally of the Ukrainian liberation movement —the armed Polish underground (in particular, by the Armia Krajowa) — due to the amnesty announced by the Government.
- And finally, the loss of the base of the so much needed support after the deportation of Ukrainian population from the territory of Zakerzonia, which was the most important factor in the defeat of the insurgents.
In itself, the Ukrainian insurgency at the time did not constitute a serious threat to the Polish government and the country. But along with the Polish armed underground it was a powerful force. If it had not been for the protective umbrella of the Soviet Armed Forces, under which the Polish State Security Forces conducted operations against the insurgents, and not for the direct assistance of the Soviet Union, the insurgency could have seriously threatened the Communist regime in Poland.
The End
