Part 1. The Russian Federation’s Black Sea Fleet and National Security of Ukraine
Part 2. Black Sea Fleet on the Scales of Political Tender
"...Leonid Kravchuk’s Presidential Decree (March 1992) also helped strengthen Ukraine’s positions in the Crimea. According to Article 77 of the Constitution of Ukraine it confirmed the republican (Ukrainian) status of Sevastopol. L.Kravchuk’s another Decree -"On Urgent Measures for Building the Armed Forces of Ukraine" suggested to begin, on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet (in coordination with the Chief Commandment of Allied CIS Armed Forces), forming the commandment bodies of the Ukrainian Navy. Simultaneously, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law "On the Division of Powers between Ukraine and the Republic of the Crimea", which laid down the status of the Republic of the Crimea as a part of Ukraine."
Part 3. How the Black Sea Fleet Was Divided “Fraternally”
However, despite all the efforts of the Ukrainian Government, political provocations in the Crimea and persecution of Ukrainian sailors by the Commandment of the BSF, not only did not stop, but were getting more intensified. At this, actions of the anti-Ukrainian campaign were being organized at both, the local and the national level. In May of 1992, the Supreme Council of the Crimea adopted the Act on the Declaration of State Independence, approved the Constitution of the Republic of the Crimea, the main principles of which contradicted the Ukrainian legislation, and also adopted a Resolution on Conducting a Crimea-wide Referendum on the 2nd of August, 1992. At the same time the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a Resolution in which the Act of Transferring the Crimean Region of the RSFSR to Ukraine was recognized unconstitutional. Moreover, the political bacchanalia in the Crimea did not stop, even after the meeting of delegations of Ukraine and Russia in Dagomys on the 23rd of July, 1992, which ended in signing an agreement in which the parties confirmed the importance of negotiations on the creation of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and the Navy of Ukraine. In accordance with the agreement, during the transitional period the existing system of basing and logistics had to be used by both. Till the end of the negotiations, the parties agreed not to take unilateral actions.
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CKP-112 - guard ship of 159A project http://ursa-tm.ru/forum |
The continuation of the openly anti-Ukrainian actions of the Supreme Legislative Body of Russia and the Supreme Council of the Crimea had caused a sharp protest of the people of Ukraine, including the Ukrainian servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet, the answer to which, in particular, became a demonstrative transition of the CKP-112 (guard ship) from Sevastopol to Odesa. The ship, under the command of Lieutenant-Captain Nastenko, raised the Ukrainian flag and became the first warship of the new Ukrainian Navy.
The case of the CKP-112 almost provoked a Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict.
To prevent transition of the guard ship into Odesa, the Black Sea Fleet Chief of Staff sent behind it a high-speed landing craft on the air cushion, with permission to use weapons. From the air, the action of the "interceptor" was coordinated by a seaplane BF BU-12, which took off without a permission of the Zonal Control Center in the South of Ukraine.
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| Commander of CKP-112 Serhiy Nastenko http://ursa-tm.ru/forum |
The crew of CKP-112 was defended from inevitable violence by the two Ukrainian border ships, which came up close to it. They escorted the CKP-112 to Odesa, where the Commandant's Service of the city put an armed guard on its board.
This case made the leaders of the Russian Federation agree to some compromises with Ukraine in the aspect of practical division of the Black Sea Fleet. The Agreement on Principles of the Division, signed in August of 1992, in Yalta, suggested a transitional period till 1995. But by that time the Fleet had to remain subordinate to both, the President of Russia and the President of Ukraine.
It would seem that the Agreement had removed most controversies and opened the way for the establishment of friendly, equal and good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Russia, as well as between their fleets. But Russian chauvinists did not like it. Having failed with a fast-playing the “Crimean card”, they focused on Sevastopol itself.
Thus, even during the meeting of the Ukrainian and Russian delegations in the summer of 1992, there had been audited the fulfillment of the moratorium on the Black Sea Fleet, and the Deputy of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation E. Pudovkin clearly outlined Russia's position as to Sevastopol. He stated that the city "has been and should remain a basis of the Russian Navy."
By this he openly expressed the position of the majority of political forces of Russia regarding the Black Sea Fleet and the place of its basing. Then it was fundamentally important for him and his thinking-alike colleagues to implement this idea.
As the main argument in the struggle for Sevastopol, Russian politicians had chosen the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Decree of 29th of October, 1948 "On Singling out the City of Sevastopol as an Independent Administrative and Economic Center." The document consisted of a single sentence, which read as follows, "To single out the city of Sevastopol as an independent administrative and economic center with its own special budget and to classify it as a city of republican subordination."
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Former Deputy of Sevastopol City Council and the Supreme Council of the Crimea Kruglov A.G.
http://www.nr2.ru/274965.html
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To initiate this idea in a new situation had a People’s Deputy of the Crimean Republic Alexander Kruglov, who was simultaneously a Deputy of the Sevastopol City Council. On the 4th of September, 1992, he wrote to the Head of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation R. Hasbulatov, asking whether the mentioned above Decree had been cancelled. Having received on the 25th of September the answer of the Head of the Juridical Department of the Supreme Council of the RF R. Tsivelev, that “the mentioned above Decree at the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to Ukrainian SSR in 1954 has not lost its validity and has not been cancelled yet”, A. Kruglov launched a wide propaganda work with active participation in it of Russian and Crimean media.
Copies of the answer he sent to his followers asking them to make it known to wide public, and handed them (in person) to various newspapers, on pages of which there immediately appeared eloquent commentaries.
Deeply obsessed with the idea of achieving the “Russian Status of Sevastopol”, A. Kruglov restarted active telephone and mail contacts with interested persons in Moscow. And to ensure a political support to this action in Sevastopol, with the direct assistance of Russia’s purely pro-Russian chauvinist organization “National Salvation Front” (NSF) was created.
The fact that the leadership of the NSF was located in Russia, and that creation of a branch of the political organization in Ukraine contradicted the Ukrainian Law, did not worry A. Kruglov. He was guided by different arguments: “…it does not matter for the NSF, in which of the so-called CIS countries live citizens of the country, which had been created for one thousand years”.
Having received from Moscow in early 1992 FNS’ materials, he gathered activists of four organizations with similar programs - the “Russian People's Assembly”, “Society for the Protection of Human Rights”, "Ecology and Life", and the so-called “Voters’ Club”, and united them into a Sevastopol branch of the “National Salvation Front”.
At this, the haste with which A. Kruglov was creating the Sevastopol branch of the “National Salvation Front”, was quite understandable: he was elected Head of the branch, and delegated to the Congress of “National Salvation Front” in Moscow.
The Congress was held pompously - out of 800 accredited journalists 377 were foreign ones. And no one would have any claims to its gathering, if not for the fact that despite the existence already of independent post-Soviet states, the Congress was organized under the slogans of a “sole and indivisible Russia”. The geography of the Congress covered almost the entire territory of the former USSR from Sakhalin to the Baltic. Ukraine was represented very solidly, although there was no official division by delegations. This was explained by the Political Council, “…patriotic forces consider the country at least within the borders of 1917”.
How could the Russian officials have reacted to such a gathering? It is enough to say that the participants of the Congress were provided with the place for the Congress. On this occasion, the Russian media wrote: “... Two thousand seven hundred delegates gathered at the Parliamentary Center of Russian Armed Forces, that is, in the official of the highest legislative power of Russia”. The co-relation of the management of the Congress with a certain part of the People's Deputies of the Russian Armed Forces revealed later during the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.
After the Moscow meetings A. Kruglov had his “head spinning around”. He started to literally ramble, for what he was criticized even by his own environment. As an example of this can serve his answer to the question from reporters, if he remembered that he was on the sovereign territory of Ukraine? With a fanatical gleam in his eye, A. Kruglov replied, “No, we are at the territory of the Russian state. Russian MPs tell us: make yourself at home; you can bring any critical situation to the limit, to the legal conflict. Suppose if they start a case against me on the grounds that Sevastopol is Ukrainian. Then the Deputies are ready to send a parliamentary delegation and attorneys, and any court will prove that we are beyond the laws of Ukraine.”
However, a particular danger of the maniac-like position of A. Kruglov was that in the political struggle around Sevastopol he was drawing into its orbit servicemen, well aware of the fact that according to the Ukrainian Law the Army is outside of politics. To the question whether he considered it right to involve into his activity the Black Sea Fleet, A. Kruglov, answered point-blankly, “Yes, we consider it possible… Navy officers are aware of this and are ready at the right moment to resolve political issues.”
On his return from Moscow to Sevastopol, A. Kruglov kept organizing gatherings, meetings, collecting council signatures beneath applications and appeals. The task of his propaganda machine was to make a “great noise” around Sevastopol in order to create conditions for bringing this issue to the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. The ultimate goal of Kruglov’s Moscow patrons sounded in his speech on the 11th of November,1992, at the Session of the Sevastopol City Council, where he stated that ”… Restoration of the USSR should start from Sevastopol “, and suggested that an “initiative group” should be created on the basis of Sevastopol City Council.
Great effort had been made for the preparation of the meeting in Sevastopol on the 21st of November, 1992. In the center of attention was the question of the need for change in the status of the city. In the Appeal to the Deputies of Russia it was proposed to discuss this at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies in order to return to Sevastopol the status of the city of republican subordination within the Russian Federation. At the meeting, a representative of “the Don Cossacks” also made a speech, saying that the Don Cossacks fully supported citizens of Sevastopol and were ready to help them.
On the 23rd of November in the Headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet was held a meeting of officers of the Air Forces, Logistics and Fleet coastal troops. The meeting, which was attended by A. Kruglov took an appeal to the Heads of the Parliaments of Ukraine, Russia, Crimea and to Sevastopol City Council Chairman to immediately review the documents relating to the Russian status of Sevastopol.
As it had been agreed with E. Pudovkin, A. Kruglov went to Moscow a week before the Congress on the 23rd of November. This time he brought with him not only the Crimean newspaper clippings and resolutions of meetings held in the Crimea and Sevastopol, but also resolutions of officers’ assemblies of the Black Sea Fleet.
Using these materials, E. Pudovkin collected signatures of representatives of fractions of the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Russia beneath the Statement demanding to include into the agenda of the Congress the question about the status of Sevastopol. Signatures of representatives of 13 fractions appeared beneath the Statement.
However, there were some comments, in particular, that the collected data were still not enough for bringing the matter to the Congress, and that the best impression on the Deputies could produce a kind of “appeal of the people”. According to A. Kruglov, at the basis of this he was asked to write the “Appeal of Citizens of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet Servicemen to People's Deputies of the Russian Federation”. This fake, written by A. Kruglov in Moscow, was approved and attached to the package of documents that had to be given to MPs.
In this package, along with the documents mentioned above, there was also a biased, with evidence of fraud, a “legal certificate on state-legal status of Sevastopol since 1948”, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR “On Singling out of the City of Sevastopol as an Independent Administrative and Economic Center”, and a copy of the answer to Deputy E. Pudovkin, which read that … “The Decree of 1954 on the official transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR has not been declared invalid and has not been canceled, no changes have been made in the Decree”. All this and some documents were supposed to prepare the Deputies to adopting a decision about Sevastopol having been a city of Republican subordination within the RF.
Exactly for this purpose the authors of the “legal certificate” used a purposeful falsification. According to their conclusion, “... according to the above mentioned Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 1948, Sevastopol in 1954 and in the years that followed, was financed from the budget of the Russian Federation, remaining the city of republican subordination of the Russian Federation”. The same certificate stated that, according to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of 1948, Sevastopol juridical remains a part of the territory of the Russian Federation, but de facto unilaterally, without the agreement with Russia, it is subject to state authorities of Ukraine.
All this was a blatant lie. In the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1937, Sevastopol was not singled out as a city of republican subordination. That Constitution, defining the state system of Russia (Article 14), did not mention cities of republican subordination. So, in the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, dated by October 29, 1948, to which refer “Russian activists”, Sevastopol was not mentioned as a special administrative unit, but only as an independent administrative and economic center with its own separate budget. At the same time, the question of territorial nature was not mentioned; in particular, the borders of the Crimean region did not change.
By the Decree of thePresidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of the 13th of February, 1954, the Crimean region was transferred from the RSFSR into the Ukrainian SSR. As the administrative-territorial division of the Crimea had not changed since 1954, the city of Sevastopol in the Crimea went into the Ukrainian SSR and was financed from the Ukrainian budget. Since 1954, financing of Sevastopol from the budget of the Russian Federation had stopped and the city is not in the administrative division of Russia (see eg. "RSFSR. Administrative –Territorial Division as of July 1, 1960." Moscow, 1960. P. 469).
Besides, in the Law “On the State Budget of the Ukrainian SSR for 1954” (“Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR”, 1953. № 3. P 7) the city of Sevastopol is not mentioned, the next year in the Law “On the State Budget of the Ukrainian SSR for 1955” (“Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR”, 1954. № 4. P 92), its budget is allocated separately.
The city’s belonging to Ukraine since 1954, was confirmed by all spheres of public and political life, particularly in the work of representative bodies. In the mentioned above period, the Deputies from Sevastopol represented its population exactly in the Supreme Council of Ukraine, not of the RSFSR. The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1978 (Article 71) mentions as cities of republican subordination only Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR of 1978 (Article 77) states that the cities of republican subordination in the Ukrainian SSR are Kiev and Sevastopol.
Besides, the Agreement between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR of the 19th of November, 1990, reads about the recognition and respect of the territorial integrity of the parties. This principle is also confirmed by international agreements of the CIS.
Despite the blatant lies in the collected “documents”, according to the plans of the Russian side, their copies had to be given not only to every and each Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, but also to all journalists. Obviously, the search and selection of materials, manufacturing fakes, their replication needed time, energy and human effort. A. Kruglov proudly reported about the work which had been done, “... During the day, we prepared 2,000 sets ... All this - thanks to the support of the leader of the group - Ye. Pudovkin”.
It is likely that without E. Pudovkin’s participation, the provocation would have failed completely. According to A. Kruglov, when E.Pudovkin got sheets of paper with signatures, he immediately rushed to the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who then took a decision to support the pro-Russian movements of the Crimea.
Similarly did the then Head of the Russian Supreme Soviet R. Hasbulatov, who was praising high the role of the Commander of Black Sea Fleet I. Kasatonov in preserving the influence of Russia in the Crimea. According to the Head of the Russian Parliament, if not for Kasatonov’s presence in the Peninsula, there would have been no dispute with Ukraine, as the Fleet would have long gone under Kiev’s command.
In general, the intentions of the leaders of the Russian Federation and supported by them anti-Ukrainian movements in the Crimea, found their reflection in the decision of the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, which, despite all the legal grounds, confirmed the “Russian” identity of Sevastopol.
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The deepening of the economic crisis in Russia, which caused a sharp deterioration in the living standards of the population, has led to a catastrophic decline in the authority of the Russian Federation leadership. The opposition immediately took an advantage of this fact, accusing the President and Government of Russia in all mortal sins, including a “betrayal of Russian interests”, which resulted in “pandering to the West” and “the loss of the former Soviet republics”. Relying on such sentences, leaders of opposition movements and parties had launched a wide campaign, in order to remove from office Boris Yeltsin and the then Russian Prime Minister E. Gaidar.
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February 2013. The Defense Ministers of Ukraine and Russia Pavel Lebedev and Sergei Shoigu met in Sevastopol.
At the first face - to - face meeting, they discussed issues of the Russian Black Sea Fleet strengthening in Crimea
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In response, the leaders of the Russian Federation, not being able within a short period of time to improve the economy of the state, tried to take over the initiative from the opposition, by adopting its main arguments for the creation of ”Great Russia”, which had to replace the former Soviet Union.
Since 1993 on, Russia has completely abandoned the principle of equal coexistence with the CIS countries, expressing its “special” interests at their territories. This policy resulted in the so-called “Yeltsin’s Doctrine”, which suggested not letting the countries of CIS (and in general, of the former Warsaw Pact) to go out of the sphere of strategic influence of Russia. And one of the main components of this doctrine became preserving Russian military presence in the CIS countries under the pretext of the existence of “a common threat to their national security”, “Russian peacekeeping activity in conflict zones”, “need to protect the Russian-speaking population” and other clearly forced pretexts.
By the way, according to political experts, the achievement by Russia of the level of a really great state is impossible without Ukraine. Ukraine for Russia is an inexhaustible human and material resource, the main market of goods, and a sort of a reliable “bridge” to the Western and South-Western Europe.
That is why the perception of Ukraine as a state with “limited sovereignty” was and remains the basis of the foreign policy of Russia in regard to Kyiv. It is clear that one of the main instruments for implementing such a policy is the Black Sea Fleet, which represents Russia’s military presence in Ukraine. And one of the reasons for its presence is a permanent worsening of the situation in the Crimea.
As before, the basis for such aggravation was created by anti-Ukrainian movements and parties, whose activity in the region was supported by Moscow.
In front of the building of the Supreme Council of the Crimea pre-paid “protesters” staged their separatist Sabbaths before TV cameras and microphones of journalists, denouncing Ukraine. From newspapers, leaflets, radio and television an information waterfall was poured on a Crimean layman. It should be noted that such an anti-Ukrainian bacchanalia was gaining speed on the provocative scenarios, well developed and tested in Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester.
As to the Black Sea Fleet, it was assigned a special role. During that period, the main form of the demonstration of pro-Russian moods in the Black Sea Fleet, chosen by its new Commander E. Baltin, was raising of St. Andrey’s flags on warships and auxiliary vessels.
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| VLS-38 http://vmsu.info |
The reason for these actions was rising on the 12th of May, 1993, of the national flag of Ukraine on the ПЖК-38, the crew of which was under severe psychological pressure of the Commandment of the Black Sea Fleet.
Raising St. Andrey’s flags was carried out at commands from the Headquarters of the Fleet, with the active support of pro-Russian organizations of the Crimea. This process was actively stimulated by the Fleet’s press. As of the end of July 1993, the flags appeared on more than100 ships and vessels of the auxiliary Fleet, on the Headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as on the Headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet coastal troops and of the 810th Marine Brigade.
Simultaneously a total Russification of the BSF begins. Despite the fact that the Fleet was formally under double commandment, and 50% of personnel of ships and units were citizens of Ukraine, structures of educational work of the BSF professed only pro-Russian political views. To the ships of the Black Sea Fleet were invited exclusively officials of Defense Ministry and Navy of the RF, public and government officials of the Russian Federation, as well as pop music groups from Russia. Representatives of Ukraine were not allowed to meetings with the personnel of the Fleet at all.
In the system of political training only themes developed for the Armed Forces of Russia were studied. A special place was occupied by the history of Russia and the Russian Navy. Informing personnel in active service was of anti-Ukrainian nature, as it was based on negative publications about Ukraine. Only Russian press was delivered to the ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet, and only Russian TV programs had to be watched according to time tables.
As to state and professional holidays, only those of the Russian Federation were marked by the BSF (Navy Day, Day of the Defender of the Motherland, etc).
In particular, on the 23rd of February, BSF widely celebrated the Day of the Defender of the Motherland, during which the so-called “marching tour of the city” as well as fireworks took place. These activities were used by the Commandment of the BSF as political actions in support of pro-Russian moods in the city and in the Fleet.
At the same time, state holidays of Ukraine were ignored and the BSF servicemen - citizens of Ukraine were deprived of marking them.
The personnel of the units of the Black Sea Fleet, which were constantly engaged in anti-Ukrainian actions in the Crimea and Sevastopol, later was replaced exclusively by citizens of the Russian Federation. In particular, in accordance with Directive NS BF № 54/1066, for further service in the Ukrainian Navy from 810 Marine Brigade all Ukrainian servicemen were sent away. This decision was taken by the Commandment of the Black Sea Fleet, without coordination with the Ukrainian government.
Though, taking into consideration the high professional level of Ukrainians (a significant number of “Russians”, called up from the region of the North Caucasus, simply did not understand the Russian language), the Commandment of the Black Sea Fleet was trying to involve them in realization of imperial goals of Russia in other areas of the Black Sea. One such example is the attempt to use Ukrainian servicemen in the started by Russia armed conflict in Abkhazia (Georgia). However, during carrying out by the contingent of the 810th Marine Brigade tasks in the region, 85 servicemen - citizens of Ukraine refused to take part in the actions and demanded to be returned to Sevastopol.
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Against this “dark” background the negotiations on solving the problems of the division of the Black Sea Fleet took place.
Actually realization of the reached in Yalta and Dagomys Agreements, as well as development of concrete proposals on the status of the transition period and the mechanism of division of the Black Sea Fleet were assigned to the interstate official delegations of Ukraine and Russia. However, these negotiations were always slow because the Russian side kept creating obstacles on the way of the negotiations.
Moreover, the Russian delegation demanded the division of the coastal infrastructure of the BSF, citing the fact that a Navy cannot exist without a land-based system. At the same time, trying to get territorial cedes from Ukraine, Russia was firmly pressing on it, promising to cut off the gas and oil supply. This position of the Russian side contradicted Yalta Agreements and other agreements signed within the CIS, as well as the global legal practice.
So, taking into consideration that all dislocated at the Ukrainian territory armed units were subordinate to Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet coastal infrastructure, also located at the Ukrainian territory, should belong to Ukraine and not fall under the division. In other words, the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine concerned only ships of the BSF. In fact, it was stated by Dagomys and Yalta Agreements.
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| Sevastopol - the main naval base of Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy base http://bastion-karpenko.narod.ru |
It should be noted that there are examples in the world practice of joint using of a shared system of basing and logistical support of naval forces in the interests of two countries. In particular, such was the basing of the 6th US Fleet in Italy. At the same time, according to international Law, it was the system of basing of Navies of two states that belonged to the state at whose territory it was situated, while other states used it, as a rule, on the conditions of leasing or conventional inter-state agreements.
From this point of view, the claims put forward by the Russian side on the division of the coastal infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet, were groundless, unjust and were, in other words, the territorial claims to Ukraine. However, based on the provisions of the Yalta Agreement, the shared use of the system and the shore-based logistics by Ukrainian Navy and the Black Sea Fleet during the transition period was quite acceptable.
But the Commandment of the Black Sea Fleet in everyday life was doing all it could to prevent the division of the fleet, as well as deliberately prevented the formation of the Ukrainian Navy, in an attempt to secure in practice the inappropriate position of the Russian delegation at the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet.
In particular, in terms of combat training, the Black Sea Fleet Commandment refused to share the educational field in Kazachya Bay (Bay of Cossacks) and the “Angara” range. No agreement was achieved on the shared use of training facilities and operational training classes.
The Commandment of the Black Sea Fleet flatly refused to provide Ukrainian Navy with the data on the marine, electronic, air, intelligence and meteorological situations. On the proposal of the Ukrainian Navy Commandment to use the “Instruction on the Mutual Exchange of Information between the CP of the Ukrainian Navy and the BSF”, Admiral E. Baltin answered with a refusal.
In the period of 1993-1994, the Commandment of the Black Sea Fleet deliberately destroyed a fleet management system and hydrographic support in the Black Sea region. E. Baltin ordered to turn off channels of communication and interaction of the Headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy with airfields in the Oktyabrsk, Gvardeysk, Mirnyi and Kacha, which threatened the safety of aircraft flights of both, Navy of Ukraine, and the Black Sea Fleet, in Ukrainian airspace.
The Black Sea Fleet was using for free the state system of communication of Ukraine, as well as supporting units of the BSF, located at the Ukrainian territory. At the same time, without any explanations, ships of the Ukrainian Navy, which were standing by 8 and 14 berths (Sevastopol), were not provided with telephone service via the network of the Black Sea Fleet. Besides, the Commandment of the Black Sea Fleet had banned using the retransmitter on Mount Ai-Petri for communication with ships of the Ukrainian Navy that was at sea. Numerous petitions from Ukrainian Navy on sharing the telephone station “Ryabina” had been ignored.
Besides, at the command of E. Baltin, the Chief of Headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral P. Svyatashov prepared Directive № DK-2 of 19/01/94 “On Termination of Free Service of Means of Navigational Equipment in the North-Western Part of the Black Sea and the North-Western Part of the Sea of Azov”. On the ground of this Directive the Hydrographic Service of the BSF unilaterally from 21/01/94, switched off all the light navigational equipment and removed all floating warning signs on the approaches to ports along the coast of Ukraine. Because of this, it became almost impossible to navigate at night. This also created preconditions for emergency situations.
Admiral Baltin conducted systematic work on destruction of the coastal surveillance along the Ukrainian coast.
For example, he ordered to remove special equipment of the “Parol” (Password) system from all radio–technical posts from Izmail to Kerch. In Zmeinyi (Snake) Island in the second half of 1993 was completely reduced the Radio platoon, which meant breaking the sole information field about the sea conditions in the Western part of the Black Sea, and losing the control of navigation in the Danube Delta and on the important operational direction Illichivsk - Odesa.
The Commandment of the 893rd Separate Radar Operating Company of the Crimean Naval Base of the Black Sea Fleet removed two sets of a radar station “MP-10” at the base of “ЗИЛ-131” lorries and 4 diesel-generators from the 1791 Radio-Technical Post’s (Cape “Bolshoy Fontan”) first line ammunition holdings and sent them to Sevastopol and from there to Novorosiysk at the excuse of repairing.
It must be said that withdrawal of material values and sending them to Russia for resale to commercial structures or destroying, was a constant practice of the BSF Commandment. As an example, we may mention here the following:
- from the 4757th Naval Hospital (Cape Fiolent) to Novorosiysk (sanatorium "Divnomorskoe") had been moved 150 units of automobile vehicles and 70 trailers with different kinds of property (sanitary engineering, medical, technical, etc.);
- from the 17th Naval Arsenal of the BSF and from the 1589 Technical Missile Base of the Black Sea Fleet under the guise of recycling all the battle reserve was moved to Novorosiysk;
- the 138 Separate Coastal Battalion was redeployed to Novorosiysk with its missile complex “Rubezh” (Frontier);
- to other places of permanent dislocation (Batumi, Poti, Novorosiysk) were moved some ships of the 16th Rescue Brigade;
- two ships of the 112 BSF Intelligence Brigade (“Kurs “and “Ladoga”) were sold to commercial structures, another ship of the same Brigade ("Ritz") was handed over to the BSF Hydrographic Service for its further being sold;
- search ships "Donbass" and "Dixon" from the 3rd Search-Rescue Brigade were also sold through commercial structures.
Characteristically, the information about the transition of the ships of BSF to the Ukrainian Navy was not passed, making it impossible to control the moving of goods from the territory of Ukraine.
In general, all such actions were carried out in order to force Ukraine to begin construction of its Naval Forces with a “clean sheet” or to make them participate in “joint” actions with the BSF not only during the “transition period”, but also in the far future, which was absolute nonsense from the point of view of the world practice and contradicted Ukrainian national interests.
