Yuriy Radkovets
The last days of the second year of stormy, extremely complex and, to put it mildly, difficult to forecast Ukraine's relations with Russia have gone. These days, of course, it is extremely important to look back and estimate: the 2015's insidious actions and provocations, as well as frequent and unexpected turns in bilateral relations and around them, to forecast the events of the upcoming 2016.
The end of 2015 demands an answer, among others, to a number of complex questions and events, such as: how long will the international political and economic sanctions of the “Crimea” and “Donbas” packets against Russia last; why were Minsk Agreements (which, actually, do not work) continued in 2016, and is there an alternative to them; what is behind the Russian military operation in Syria and will “the Syrian gambit” bring V. Putin a victory in Ukraine; what are the peculiarities of the Russian-Turkish crisis and its possible consequences, and so on.
In the autumn of 2015, V. Putin's regime hoped that the international isolation of Russia will finally be eliminated. It seemed that the international political and economic sanctions (particularly the sanctions of the “Donbas” package) against Russia would be canceled or at least significantly limited. It also seemed that “the Syrian gambit” would provide Russia with the victory and the Americans were about to make concessions over Ukraine in exchange for Russia's participation in the war against the Caliphate IS (“Islamic State”). That is, it seemed to many that V. Putin's things were going right, and the Kremlin was preparing to celebrate “victory”.
And suddenly, like a cold shower on the heads of the participants of the Russian adventure fell a very bad news: the United States introduced new sanctions against Russia. December 22, 2015 the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Department of the Treasury determined 34 individuals and legal entities against whom it intensified sanctions. “The current steps confirm the USA's commitment to finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Ukraine through our support of sanctions against Russia. These sanctions will not weaken until Russia has fully fulfilled its obligations under the Minsk Agreements, including the return to Ukraine of the control over its part of the state border with Russia”, states the report of the Office.
The day before this event, December 21, 2015 the EU formally adopted a decision to extend sanctions against Russia for another six months (until July 31, 2016). According to Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union will not reconsider sanctions against Russia for its policies towards Ukraine, just in exchange for cooperation with Russia in the settlement of the Syrian conflict. “Europe is interested in cooperation with Russia on the most important topics for us. But it will never be Moscow's trump card in the issue of the lifting of sanctions over Ukraine”, said F. Mogherini.
At the same time, the decision to prolong sanctions against Russia this time was not easy for the European Union. Among a number of the EU Member States is being spread (with treacherous participation of the Russian political and business elite) the idea of usefulness of continuation of sanctions against Russia.
That is, the continuation of the “Donbas” package of sanctions against Russia, their easing or lifting, the West today clearly relates to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
As for the “Crimean” package of sanctions, the European Union and the United States do not recognize Russia's forcible annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea, and therefore they will consider lifting those sanctions only after the de-occupation of the Crimea. This information was confirmed in December 2015 by Daniel Fried, the State Department’s Coordinator for Sanctions Policy. At that, he pointed out that the United States and the European Union had agreed on the fact that the sanctions imposed because of the occupation and subsequent annexation of the Crimea are absolutely separate from the “Donbas” package of sanctions. These (“Crimean”) sanctions may continue after fulfillment of the Minsk Agreement, added Fried. Coordinator of the US Sanctions also warned that international sanctions against Russia can actually be intensified, “... if Russia and its puppets again inflame a full-scale conflict and take a military aggression outside the line of contact” in the east of Ukraine.
December 31, 2015, the time of implementation of one of the key documents of the Minsk Agreements — the famous Complex of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation in the Donbas, ended. In fact, it is a sort of “road map” consisting of 13 (thirteen) points, adopted February 12, 2015 after the talks of the leaders of the “Norman Four”. None of the 13 points has been fulfilled to the end.
Today, only the laziest political scientists, analysts and experts are not saying that the Minsk Agreements did not work in 2015. They did not work precisely because Russia, apart from some purely demonstration activities, in general was not going to comply with them, especially the most important ones, namely: it did not withdraw its heavy weapons and personnel (9-10 thousand) from the Donbas, and without this any talks about free elections in the occupied territories of the Donbas, as well as the question of cooperation with those territories or the resumption of the Ukrainian control over the section of the Ukrainian-Russian border simply make no sense.
But why is Putin's regime defiantly failing to fulfill the Minsk Agreements? Why, knowing that failure to comply with the Minsk Agreements almost automatically results in continuation (or intensification!) of international sanctions against Russia, the Russian side artificially slows down their fulfillment, lying that it is the Ukrainian side that is not willing to comply with them?
The answer lies in the fact that:
Firstly, V. Putin himself cynically ignores the decisions taken within the framework of the Minsk Agreements (Minsk Protocol, Minsk Memorandum and Minsk Complex of Measures), explaining that Russia is not a party to the conflict in the Donbas, and Ukraine should personally negotiate “on equal terms” with the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR/LPR), including on: introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine on the special status of the occupied territories of the Donbas; organizing and conducting (“questions of modality”) elections in the occupied territories; granting amnesty (security guarantees) to field commanders and fighters of the separatist movement in the Donbas and so on;
Secondly, V. Putin's regime is making its last effort trying to “prove” to Europe, the US and the Western countries as a whole (in the situation of growing of their “fatigue syndrome” from the events around Ukraine) “ineffectiveness of international sanctions against Russia and their harm to the West's countries themselves”;
Thirdly, this way the Kremlin actually demonstrates to the West the potential threat of resumption at any time of the armed aggression against Ukraine, provocatively boasting of the impunity of its previous military actions in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Ukraine (in the Crimea and Donbas).
About the need to prolong the Minsk Agreements in 2016, Russian officials kept speaking since the fall of 2015. Telephone conversation of December 30, 2015 of the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia on the situation in the Ukrainian Donbas showed that European negotiators actually supported this proposal. The deadline for fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements has been transferred into 2016 and the next round of talks in this format (at the level of Foreign Ministers) will be held not earlier than the first ten days of February 2016. Most likely, they will be held before the Munich Security Conference (February 12-14, 2016). This stipulates that “... the parties to the conflict continue fulfilling the commitments they have taken”. A sort of a new deadline may be considered July 31, 2016 — to this date the European Union has continued its sanctions against Russia, having actually “fined” it for its failure to comply with the Minsk Agreements.
But, given the fact that the most difficult points of the Minsk peace process must be followed, experts do not exclude that this benchmark will not be final. Some close to the Kremlin experts believe that the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (as of today) can stretch for a longer term than the supposed one year.
The Advisor to the Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine Viktor Budyk does not exclude complete failure of the Minsk Agreements. “The military servicemen at the front line now see the only way out — the surrender of the two self-proclaimed republics, with further general amnesty, he said. — According to my information, in Donetsk many are seriously considering this option, if they get guarantees for their security”. Russia will hardly agree to such a scenario. That is, under such circumstances we can't exclude the threat of resumption of the forceful stage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
The question of implementation of the Minsk Agreements by the parties to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and lifting (easing) or intensifying of international sanctions against Russia is closely linked to the conduct of the Russian military operation in Syria, and the aggravation of Russian-Turkish relations.
Beginning September 30, 2015 the military operation in Syria (as an air-strike one), Russia was trying to regain the status of a world-class state. According to official information from the Ministry of Defence, the Russian aviation causes fire strikes on positions of IS (“Islamic State”) militants in Syria — communication centers, ammunition and fuel depots, as well as places of concentration of military equipment and personnel of the IS. In reality, as it has turned out, the vast majority of air strikes are on the objects of the opposition forces of Syria, so those strikes kill civilians, including children.
Later Russia began to support B. Assad's government forces in ground operations (with the assistance of the marine units of the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, airborne troops and special forces of the RF Armed Forces) against the opposition forces in Syria's Latakia province in the north-west and south where its personnel suffered substantial losses.
The situation around the Russian operation in Syria is complicated by the Russian-Turkish crisis that arose as a result of the shooting down (November 24, 2015) by the combat aircraft F-16 of Turkey's Air Force of the Russian bomber SU-24 which intruded into Turkey's airspace. Russia's sanction war against Turkey, which began after the incident, has all chances to get expanded and gain new forms of a “hybrid” Russian-Turkish war on the territory of Turkey and in the region of Black Sea straits. At the same time, since the Russian-Turkish relations have become more complicated, Moscow will hardly push Ankara to escalate military confrontation. The Kremlin understands that the more joint positions with partners in NATO and the EU Turkey has, the weaker will be Russia's positions in the post-Soviet space.
So, it is likely that Russia will get “bogged down” in the Syrian war, because so far it is not clear how long this “Russian military campaign in a remote theater of war” will last and what its ultimate goal is. V. Putin's declarative statements that “... the operations will not last forever” and that “... they are held to support government forces of Syria” — do not answer this question.
According to Borysfen Intel's experts, the answer to this question must be sought in both, declared and hidden geopolitical goals and plans of the Kremlin.
Thus, the declared by V. Putin at the UN ambitions of Russia's participation in the fight against international terrorism as part of a broad anti-terrorist Coalition against radical Islamists under the auspices of the United Nations (the base of which would make Islamic countries), has failed to be implemented. And will hardly be implemented in 2016. The international antiterrorist Coalition under the leadership of the United States has been more than a year (since autumn 2014). If they are ready to accept Russia, then only as an ordinary partner — this obviously does not suit Moscow — it would like to be there only “on an equal footing” with the United States.
The possibility that the USA with its international anti-terrorist Coalition will join the Russia-Iran-Iraq-Syria alliance is from fantasy area.
Besides, Saudi Arabia in December 2015, created and led its own broad Muslim countries' Coalition against terrorism (so-called “Islamic Military Coalition against Terrorism”, which does not include Iran, Iraq, Syria and Oman). For V. Putin this circumstance is of great importance, since the military alliance created by Saudi Arabia will possibly be fighting not so much the IS, as will be deterring Russia's strategic partner in the region — Iran.
That's all that is on the surface. And what are the Kremlin's hidden geopolitical goals and plans? Based on the analysis of available information, the experts of Borysfen Intel point out most important of them:
- As maximum — to break up the European Union, as minimum — to turn it into an amorphous dysfunctional organization by: creation of preconditions for the emergence of the EU social and economic problems, including all sorts of riots and protests; Putin clique's supporting ultra-right-wing European political parties and movements, which may lead to the transformation of consciousness of the electorate professing key European civilizational values and to contradictions within European countries (primarily in Germany); provoking and supporting contradictions between EU countries, especially between the countries of Western and Central Europe (“old EU countries”) and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (“young EU”), and in an ideal — between the United Europe (the European Union) and the United States.
Today, one of the most effective mechanisms for the creation of such a crisis in Europe is an artificial massive filling the EU countries with refugees (including criminal and specially trained radical elements) from the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and so on) and, as a result — providing them with additional financial burden, which causes internal political, social, economic, criminal law and immigration issues in the EU, used for their own purposes by external forces (read — first of all, by V. Putin's regime).
Another hidden goal of personally V. Putin (he is vengeful and vindictive man) and his criminal regime is realization (within the framework of the “Russia's hybrid policy”) of plans to discredit personally Chancellor Angela Merkel for her principled position (as one of the key leaders of the EU) in relation to Russia's violent annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea and the Russian occupation of certain territories of the Donbas. Attention of international political scientists and experts is attracted by the fact that recent events in Cologne and Istanbul show that they are focused exclusively against Germany and A. Merkel's reasonable immigration policy on refugees from the Middle East. Someone (?) is extremely eager to set up German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her attempts to stabilize migration policies in the EU in the current difficult conditions. Who? In our opinion, this is a rhetorical question;
- To contribute to the rise in oil prices through destruction of the oil infrastructure in the Middle East, creating preconditions for increasing of the volume of production and sales of oil by Russia (possibly, in cooperation with Iran), as well as to set control over the main channels (routes) of transportation of energy carriers from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to Europe.
However, to wage war on two fronts (Syrian and Ukrainian) is very difficult for Russia, and most importantly — it is very expensive. Therefore, Russian politicians, military and diplomats are now actively searching for the most suitable ways out of this (futureless and threatening for Russia) situation.
The acceptable strategy for Russia's getting out of the “Syrian” war could be the following scenario: Russia turns off the operation after its Air Force's strikes, the IS forces are pushed from Syria to Iraq, which is the responsibility of the Americans.
Then Putin could “victoriously” say something like: “... Russia has performed its “international duty” to the people of Syria”, and quietly get out of there, in fact, as they say, having saved face. But there is little hope for this. On the contrary — V. Putin wants to have a guaranteed influence in the region, and for this it is extremely important to him to maintain a military presence there — as a minimum: the Naval Base in Tartus and Air Force Base in Hmeymim. In confirmation of this, August 26, 2015 Russia and the Syrian Arab Republic signed an Agreement on deployment of a Russian air group in Syria (at the airfield Hmeymim) on an unprecedented conditions, namely free of charge, not limited in time and without any claims on the Syrian side.
Clearer and more favorable for Russia would look perspectives of “Vienna process” (the process of a political settlement in Syria). Although the conflict between Moscow and Ankara to some extent complicated its course, most likely the participants in the negotiations in due course will manage to reach a certain agreement. Especially because one of the main sources of the discrepancies — the fate of B. Assad — has been removed: his immediate resignation (as a precondition for a political settlement in Syria) before the end of 2016 has ceased to be mentioned.
That is most likely that this way of a political settlement in Syria will be used by Moscow in its relations with the United States and Europe, by analogy with the question of the peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear program.
Not everything goes right with possible acceptable to Russia options for its exit from the “Ukrainian” war.
The matter is that the Kremlin's geopolitical goals regarding Ukraine have remained (they have not disappeared), namely: to prevent the success of reforms in Ukraine; to interfere with Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration; to keep Ukraine in the area of its dominant influence; and in general — to maintain control over Ukraine.
As for the occupied territories of the Donbas and the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People's Republic” and “Luhansk People's Republic” there, today Moscow imposes on Kyiv its own interpretation of the Minsk Agreements and focuses the main effort on the reintegration of the so-called DPR/LPR into the constitutional field of Ukraine providing them with special status (enshrined in the Constitution), which on the one hand, would mean shifting the financial and economic burden of responsibility onto Ukraine, and on the other — it would actually give Russia the ability to manipulate its puppets, influencing at the same time the internal and foreign policy of Ukraine. That is, the Kremlin actually wants a “second Trans-Dniester”, and in fact — federalization of Ukraine.
At the same time V. Putin's regime is intensifying its activities within the framework of the “hybrid policy” (“hybrid war”/“hybrid peace”) to loosen the political and economic situation in Ukraine, including in its central, southern and western regions, with a view to both failure of reforms in Ukraine and creation of preconditions for general weakening of the pro-European government authority throughout the country.
Besides, December 23, 2015, Russian hackers for the first time purposefully took several powerful cyber-attacks against Ukrainian suppliers of electricity (we are talking about objects of “PrikarpatOblenergo”), that is, against the critical infrastructure for the civilian population of Ukraine, that actually brought them down, as a result, problems with electricity supply were observed throughout the region, including Ivano-Frankivsk. This raises the question about the degree of protection of critical infrastructures in Ukraine from such cyber-attacks.
It should also be understood that V. Putin's regime, under various pretexts will be artificially lingering with the issue of withdrawal of Russian groups and terrorist forces from the occupied territories of the Donbas and Ukraine's regaining control of the section of the Ukrainian-Russian state border. That is, it can be argued that in this way the Russian side will retain the opportunity and the ability to resume large-scale military operations against Ukraine, especially with the beginning of spring and a month or so before July 31, 2016 (the date of the expiration of the EU's “Donbas” sanctions against Russia), despite estimates and statements of some Ukrainian and foreign analysts that V. Putin's regime would refrain from such actions. Possible directions of tactical blows of the Russian-terrorist forces may be Mariupol and Donetsk, and the Crimea, which converge near New Kakhovka — the main transport and technology center of concentration and distribution of water, gas and electricity to the Crimea.
Returning to the question of the effectiveness of the Minsk (“Norman”) format of the negotiation process on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it should be noted that today there is no alternative to it, because if not for the Minsk negotiation process, there would be no “Donbas” package of international sanctions against Russia. But again, this does not mean that this (“Norman’) format of the negotiation process cannot be transformed (improved and perfected), for example, into the format of “Norman +” by the “Geneva”, and in the future perhaps, the “Budapest” formats' participants joining it. The main thing is to expand the format of the negotiation process on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to an international scale with the relevant powers and status.
As for the settlement of the “Crimean” issue, in any case, it is inappropriate to attach it to the Minsk negotiation process, as it is a separate issue of long-term importance, and it will require a separate decision strictly within the framework of the international negotiations, possibly under the auspices of the UN or the “Budapest” format. And the constant presence of the existing “Crimean” package of international sanctions against Russia or possibility of its strengthening by the international community will maintain its importance and inevitability, even if Russia returns the occupied territories of the Ukrainian Donbas.
So, the situation in the world, Europe and around Ukraine in 2016 remains very complicated, difficult to predict, and will maintain the dangerous trend to further complications.
This situation is objectively complicated by the fact that 2016 in the United States is the year of the “lame duck”, that is the last year of the American President in office when the weight and influence of any occupant of the White House — regardless of his former popularity and success — start falling.
In such circumstances, experts of Borysfen Intel believe that it is appropriate to draw an analogy with 2008, when it was George Bush Junior's turn to be called “lame duck”.
Many considered him quite a weak president, though it was not true. George W. Bush acted very strongly after the September 11 attacks, he sent troops to Afghanistan and then to Iraq — and seemingly won both the wars: drove the Taliban out of Kabul and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. But then his good luck failed: he nearly lost the 2004 elections to the same John Kerry; he did not show leader's qualities in the matters of Hurricane Katrina; in Iraq and Afghanistan earlier military victories were replaced by a succession of setbacks; at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, Bush failed to realize his plans to provide Ukraine and Georgia with Membership Action Plan: the main allies — Germany and France, not without a successful pressure from Russia (read — personally Putin) rejected it.
As a result, V. Putin, sensing weakness of the US President George Bush Jr., decided to take advantage of it and held in August 2008 Blitzkrieg (“08/08/08”) against Georgia, and in the winter of 2008-2009 — “Gas war” against Ukraine and Europe.
According to leading experts, there is a real danger that something similar could happen again in 2016. At the same time, Barack Obama, (as a politician-peacemaker!), as V. Putin sees him, could be considered a weak politician, and he will be tempted to resort to force in another adventure: whether in Ukraine, or again, in Georgia or in Trans-Dniester, or in the Baltic region. And maybe somewhere else in the former Soviet Union or on the perimeter of the borders of the Russian Federation.
Besides, the United States in 2016 will be fully absorbed by the presidential elections, during which the issues of domestic policy always overshadow international concerns. Even if they are included in the top questions of the election campaign, as it is now — for the first time in many years! — the question is what to do with Russia?
V. Putin's drastic steps can be provoked also by the fact that virtually any next occupant of the White House will be a supporter of tougher stance towards Russia, and a much more open supporter of Ukraine. And in general he will become more interested in international affairs and will begin fighting for the return of the US global leadership, which in some way deteriorated during the years of Barack Obama's presidency.
This temptation to V. Putin could be strengthened by the fact that the European allies of the USA in 2016 will have completely different priorities: the solution of the refugee problem; the risk of Greece’s exit (GREXIT) from the euro zone; future referendum in the UK on its further stay in the EU (2017).
Besides, the policy of the main US allies in Europe — Germany and France — in 2016 will also fall into increasing dependence on their preparations for the national elections scheduled for 2017.
So, the temptation for V. Putin is big enough: to test the strength of the West now or never. That is why the next 12 months in 2016 will be very uneasy.
The article was published in the edition of the Romanian Center “INGEPO Consulting Company” —
“Geostrategic Pulse” № 208, 20.02.2016
