Analysis of the Development of International Security and Its Impact on the National Security of Ukraine

• Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and its further militarization, which leads to a change in the military-political balance in the Black Sea region; the Russian Federation's support of terrorists in eastern regions of Ukraine;

• transformation of the situation in Ukraine into one of the questions of the resumed positional confrontation between the West (USA, Europe, NATO) and the East (Russia), which has led to the aggravation of Russia-NATO and Russia-United States relations, in which other countries are getting involved;

• activation by the countries of Eastern Europe of measures to strengthen their own security and defense, including by having deployed on their territories additional NATO forces, increased spending on arms procurement, intensification of military training of reservists;

• uncertainty about the future steps of the West and Iran to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and the possibility of changing of the balance of power in the Middle East in case of Tehran's going out of international isolation;

• sharpening of the situation in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) in the situation of the USA and Japan's confrontation with China;

• Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the danger of its spread to other continents.

2. Analysis of the factors affecting the security situation in the world

2.1 The annexation of the Crimea and strengthening of the military component of Russia's foreign policy

After the annexation of the Crimea, Russia began a full-scale process of militarization of the Peninsula. The ongoing transformation of the Crimea into a powerful military foothold of the RF leads to transformation of the overall balance of forces in the Black Sea region in favor of the Russian side.

Militarization of the Peninsula is accompanied by:

significant increase in the military grouping of the Russian side and plans to restore the infrastructure to serve the Air Force and Navy with nuclear missiles near the village Krasnokamenka of Feodosia district, where in Soviet times were stored nuclear warheads;
using the State Aviation Research Centre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Feodosia) for testing of naval weapons. Thus, from January 1, 2015 it is planned to establish on its basis three departments under the State Flight Test Center of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense named after V. Chkalov. Now the Russian side has already restored one of the test sites of the Center — the airfield in Kirov (near Feodosia). By the end of the year it is planned to restore the plant for finishing torpedoes and missiles in Ordzhonikidze (which functioned in Soviet times);
establishing control over shipbuilding enterprises in the Crimea by Russian companies' buying control packets of shares. At the same time, taking into consideration the international sanctions and boycott by Western business structures of cooperation with enterprises of the annexed by Russia Crimean Peninsula, loading shipbuilding capacity is planned to be achieved through the deployment of military orders for the construction of ships for the Russian Federation's Navy.

Ministry of Regional Development of Russia and the Russian Federation's Black Sea Fleet are considering options of redesigning Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet bases for the following:

reconstruction of Khersones airport (lengthening the runway to 2.2-2.3 km), which will allow to completely transfer airport “Belbek” to the military and to use Khersones airport in case of emergencies;
uniting military production facilities into one logistics center (the area of “Oil harbor”) with access to the railway;
transfer of disparate objects of the Russian Black Sea Fleet into a single compact center with the aim of improving their management and raising the level of safety;
optimizing the locations of the units of the border troops in the western bay (Balaclava).

Russia also continues to increase its military presence along the eastern borders of Ukraine. Thus, as of mid-August, groupings of the Armed Forces and Interior Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RF along the state border of Ukraine totaled to 34 battalion and 3 company tactical groups in amounts of not less than 45 thousand military servicemen. The troops are on their service with about 150 tanks, about 1 400 armored combat vehicles, more than 400 artillery systems, about 150 multiple rocket launching systems, 190 combat aircrafts and 130 attack helicopters, as well as 30 warships and boats, and two submarines. Apart from the army units and military equipment, along the Russian-Ukrainian border are being created warehouses of fuels and lubricants, ammunition, and are being concentrated engineer-sapper and medical units of the RF Armed Forces.

Since the beginning of the year, under various pretexts, Russia has held more than 20 planned and unplanned trainings, both within the framework of military districts of the Russian Federation, and at the international level, which, apart from improving the combat readiness of Russian troops were intended to prevent the possibility of a sharp reaction to the events in the east of Ukraine.

It can be stated that the Russian Federation is leading against Ukraine the so-called “remote war”, which in fact is drawing rocket and artillery strikes on military infrastructure and forces of the ATO. This, combined with the concentration of troops on the border, is aimed at exercising constant pressure on Ukraine and the West's leaderships, binding of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, periodic “equalization” of the military balance between the militants forces and Ukrainian Army, covering-up “corridors” of logistical supplies for the separatists, ensuring a fast deployment of troops in case of carrying out a “peacekeeping operation”.

Analysis of data on the militarization of the Crimea and destabilization of the situation in south-eastern regions of Ukraine suggests that Moscow's ultimate goal is redistribution of in Russia's favor of the balance of power in the Eastern European and Black Sea regions through creation of pro-Russian arc from the south of Moldova to the Caucasus (Gagauzia — Trans-Dniester - south east of Ukraine — Russian Federation - Abkhazia — South Ossetia – Georgia – Armenia — Azerbaijan). This will lead to “tectonic” shifts in the military-political balance of forces in the Black Sea-Caspian region, not only in favour of Russia, but also in favour of the CSTO. At this, Moscow's aggressive and offensive-dominated policy, based on the use of the existing contradictions in Europe in combination with the incapacity of international mechanisms of checks and counterbalances, can lead to European disintegration processes, and in the future will allow Russia to extend the pro-Russian arc to the Balkan region through Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Serbia.

An important element of this scenario may become Russia's attempt to establish full control over the Sea of Azov, turning it into an “internal Russian sea”. In this context, the Russian Federation can take the following steps:

to set in the Kerch Strait the so-called “filter mode” (compulsory inspection of all “suspicious” transit vessels, regardless of their registration status and nationality) using for this purpose some of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's warships, crews, specialists-border guards and customs;
to create new special subunits for the Coast Guard of the Russian coast of the Azov Sea and to provide them with high-tech anti-diversionary equipment;
to strengthen the patrol (including anti-submarine) aviation in the region;
to arrange 24 hour patrols of the Sea of Azov waters along the Ukrainian coast;
to speed up the construction of the bridge (or tunnel) through the Kerch Strait and so on.

2.2 Sharpening of the confrontation between the East and West

The Russian Federation's aggressive actions have made actual for the leadership of NATO and its member states the need to take important measures in the sphere of security and defense on the eastern borders, including by a substantial increase in the number of Armed Forces of NATO, strengthening patrolling the airspace and water areas. They also influenced the agenda for the September summit of the Alliance (Newport, UK, 4-5 September).

In this context, sound interesting some provisions of the published July 31, 2014 report of the House of Commons Committee on Defence of the British Parliament (dedicated to the Russian threat and corresponding countermeasures), in particular concerning the following:

nearly zero probability of Russia's realization in the nearest future of the risky strategy of open political confrontation with the West. At the same time the Russian Federation will continue to put pressure on Ukraine in order to keep it in its sphere of influence, which may have negative consequences for the security not only in the European region, but also in the global dimension;
importance of taking a strategic decision to increase the capacity of non-nuclear NATO forces, as well as activation of trainings in regions bordering on Russia and Ukraine;
the need for creation in the military structure of the Alliance of new headquarters of division and corps level, directly responsible for the management of NATO forces in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States;
urgency of the immediate strengthening by the Alliance of intelligence activities in relation to Russia (increase in funding and the number of specialists with knowledge of the Russian language).

Preparation for the September summit of the Alliance showed some differences in the approaches of NATO member states (particularly of France):

the need to recognize the growing role of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as a reliable means of protection the Alliance' territory;
disapproval of transformation of the NATO-Russia relations into the plane of confrontation against the background of the trend towards growth of other regional and global challenges and threats (regional instability, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cyber crime);
importance of maintaining a political dialogue with Russia with simultaneous curtailment of military cooperation;
support of the Alliance' integration initiatives, in particular, of a radical change in the tasks of the NATO Response Force, and promotion of European member countries of the Alliance in the future application of efforts in the field of defense, which must be supported by the unanimity of decisions at the EU level;
the need to strengthen coordination at different levels of NATO and the European Union's activity (political, military-strategic, operational and tactical), with the proviso that the development of the role of the Alliance in strengthening defense capabilities of non-EU countries, does not cover activity of the EU in this sphere.

So, one should expect that after the NATO Summit in the UK, in the context of the events in Ukraine, agreeing on a common European position on defense will continue.

Under the US Atlantic Council has been established the Expert Working Group to prepare proposals for granting Ukraine Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status

It should be noted that in order to reduce military-political risks for Ukraine, including in the MIC, under the US Atlantic Council has been established the Expert Working Group to prepare proposals for the US government on cooperation in the political, economic and defense issues with our country and granting Ukraine the MNNA status^[1].

At the same time the speed of NATO's adaptation to new challenges and threats, coming from the Russian Federation, is constrained by the following factors:

reluctance of European allies to make a financial contribution to the defense of Europe-most member-countries do not fulfill their obligations in terms of financing of defense, and in the development of forces and abilities of the Association;
lack of coordination in formation of national defense budgets as well as in interaction between the military leaderships of member countries and structures of the Alliance;
distrust between member states on the issue of their unquestioning use of military force in case of aggression against one of the NATO member countries.

Problematic issues of transformation of the EU's defense policy will be discussed at an informal meeting of the EU countries' Defense Ministers in Milan 9-10 September 2014.

Also are being updated approaches of the EU member-countries to implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in terms of deployment in Ukraine of CSDP civilian mission to help to reform the national security sector. In particular, within the framework of the preparation for the deployment of this mission, European countries in late July lifted a ban on deliveries to Ukraine of arms and protection means that can be used to suppress demonstrations (the decision to ban was adopted in February 2014) ^[2].

Besides, the European External Action Service, the European Defence Agency and the European Commission are planning to have connected the defense sector of CSDP to the strategy of supporting the development of the capacity of local and regional partners, as well as to systematic and long-term cooperation in the defense sector by the end of 2014, including incentives for the promotion of joint projects. The priority areas of cooperation and interaction are considered the creation of a multinational fleet of tanker aircrafts, UAVs, protection of cyberspace and establishment of a system of government satellite communications, improving the process of financing the EU's military operations.

2.3 Activities in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States to strengthen their own security

Russia's flagrant violation of international law and open disregard of provisions of the Budapest Memorandum mobilized the UK, Baltic States and Eastern Europe for deepening cooperation within NATO in order to strengthen their own defenses. At the same time, the greatest interest in strengthening NATO's military presence on their territories is shown by Romania, Poland and the Baltic states.

Thus, from the very beginning of Russia's annexation of the Crimea, Romania intensified dialogue with the NATO and USA's leaderships in order to protect the country's sovereignty, including by increasing the presence in the State of the Alliance forces. The greatest concern of the Romanian side is possibility of Russia's realizing in Moldova a scenario similar to the Crimean one, using military presence in Trans-Dniester of the 14th Army of the RF Armed Forces and Cossack units.

Bucharest sees joint naval trainings in territorial waters of the Black Sea with air and missile-carrying group of US Navy and NATO as elements of deterring Moscow's expansionist plans. Romania has also received assurances of the immutability of the US plans to put into operation in 2015 Romanian elements of the defense shield.

Under the influence of the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation, Poland is revising its priorities and sequencing of major operational programs for the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, increasing the number of weapons and military equipment and reducing the timing of orders.

The main priorities have been determined strengthening of the potential of the intelligence, air (primarily anti-missile) defense, mobility of troops. The above-mentioned includes purchase of UAVs, combat and multi-purpose helicopters, military transport aircrafts and air defense systems, for which purpose the Polish defense budget in 2014 was increased by 14 % and the total defense spending — from 1.95 to 2 % of GDP.

This year, Poland began training of reservists by instructors from Special Forces, who (reservists) should be involved in diversionary work in case of external aggression against the state and occupation of its territory. They are also preparing a radical reform of the National Reserve Forces (NSR) — will be expanded annual mandatory training for reservists to 50 thousand people (in 2013 were retrained 3.5 thousand, in the first half of 2014 — already 7 thousand).

July 28, Defense Ministers of Poland and the United Kingdom decided in the nearest future to hold Polish-British joint military trainings in Poland called “Black Eagle” with the participation of about 1.300 British soldiers and more than 350 units of the British military equipment. Warsaw has also reached agreements in principle with NATO on military bases of the Alliance in the country.

According to the Commander-in-Chief of Integrated Forces in Europe, General F. Bridlav's plans, on the eastern flank within the framework of building closer to the border with the Russian federation of infrastructure of rapid response, there will be created the largest base for storage of weapons, ammunition and food. The possible place of its location is the Polish Baltic port of Szczecin, where is located the NATO Multinational Corps “Northeast”, which can later be transformed into a full-fledged headquarters capable at any time to take troops to participate in activities in response to the aggression against NATO member states.

The Baltic States have expressed their being interested in deployment in their territories of elements of NATO missile defense

In their turn, the Baltic States have expressed their being interested in deployment in their territories of elements of NATO missile defense to protect against aircrafts or missiles stationed at military bases in the western region of Russia. Such a reaction of the Baltic States to the crisis in Ukraine was due mainly to the fact that these countries have a land border with Russia, as well as the fact that the Russian-speaking ethnic minority in them is a significant part of the population (in Latvia — 27 %, in Estonia — 24 %, in Lithuania — 5 %). All these states due to their limited human and financial resources, weak geostrategic position (location between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia) demand from NATO member countries to intensify the Alliance's activities in the region.

Fundamental differences in the positions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on strengthening NATO's presence in the region were seen at the meeting of leaders of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria (Warsaw, July 22). In particular, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania were in favor of a significant strengthening of NATO's defense policy and deployment of troops of the Alliance in the region on a regular basis. Against such an approach were Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for fear of worsening political and economic relations with Moscow.

Their position is correlated with the opinion of individual NATO member countries in Western Europe, considering deployment of the Alliance's subunits in the region on a permanent basis as a violation of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (Paris, 27 May 1997), in which the Alliance promised not to place permanent “substantial combat forces” in Central and Eastern Europe. At this, Germany considers that any deployment on a permanent basis of NATO forces near the borders of Russia may lead to unnecessary escalation of tensions with Moscow.

In such circumstances, in the countries of Vyshegrad group (V-4) is possible a split on the basis of different attitudes to the military threat from Moscow, which might encourage Poland to refocus on cooperation with the Baltic States, sharing Warsaw's point of view on the subject.

Hungary demonstrates the growing trend of V. Orban's government to distance from both the European Union and the economic and political ties with the United States, while strengthening relations with Russia. At the same time, at the ceremony of passing over to Slovakia of the presidency in the Vyshegrad Group on July 1, Hungarian Defence Minister C. Hende announced about Hungary's initiatives to hold at the beginning of 2015 regular joint trainings of V-4; ensuring by January 1, 2016 full readiness of the Visegrad Battlegroup(ability to perform tasks at a distance of up to 6 thousand kilometers from the borders of the EU with effective forces up to 3.360 military servicemen). C. Hende also pointed out that Defense Ministers of the V-4 countries have agreed on the Ukrainian Armed Forces' units' being included into the Battlegroup of the V-4.

Bulgaria having repeatedly expressed concern about the destabilization of the situation in the region and having stressed the need to strengthen the defense capabilities of NATO in the Black Sea, in contrast to the Baltic States, Poland and Romania, has not formulated its clear demands within the framework of the Alliance.

2.4 Strengthening of the military component of the CIS

Russia has activated its efforts to create a joint military component of the Eurasian Union on the basis of the CSTO

In response to the increase in NATO's military presence on the territory of Poland, Russia has activated its efforts to create a joint military component of the Eurasian Union based on the CSTO and its cooperation with the RF Armed Forces.

Thus, fighter interceptors Su-27P of the RF Air Force lately have been daily patrolling Belarus' western border while a Russian Air Force long-range radar detection aircraft A-50 has been doing radio reconnaissance.

Besides, the Air Force of the Republic of Belarus in cooperation with the Russian side constantly conduct trainings on target interception, which may pose a threat to the aforementioned aircrafts, using Air Defense systems of Belarus. Besides, the Air Defense systems and forces around Minsk are in heightened alert.

At the regular meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers of CIS member states on July 3 was discussed Kyrgyzstan's being supplied with Russian arms and military equipment, including in the context of the withdrawal of NATO's Coalition Forces from Afghanistan, as well as priority measures to supply the 201st Russian military base in Tajikistan. However, Kazakhstan attracts Turkish companies to its defence projects. In particular, there are consultations with specialists of corporation of engineering and chemical industry of Turkey on the construction of a munitions factory in Kazakhstan.

At this, the main efforts of the Russian Federation are focused on consolidating around itself of CSTO partners, imposing “bloc thinking” on them, within the framework of which there will be no room for neutrality. Thus, during the meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CSTO in Moscow on June 10, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu pointed out the concern about “color revolutions” as a factor of destabilization of the political landscape in different states and encouraged the delegations of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to discuss possible measures of mutual support during the growth of external threats, political and economic pressure, strengthening and revitalization of the MTC and activation of work for raising the efficiency of the force component of the CSTO.

The above-mentioned event was preceded by the Russian International Security Conference (Moscow, 23-24 May), which due to the situation in Ukraine was boycotted by the NATO member countries and the EU, except for Spain, Greece and Cyprus. The main idea of the Conference was to substantiate the thesis that the current priority for Russia is cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, as well as with countries of Africa and Latin America.

2.5 Development by states of the world of missile defense systems

The tense situation remains also in the sphere of development by countries of the world of their own and collective anti-missile defense. After the annexation of the Crimea, the Russian side was not invited to the Conference on the issue of missile defense (June 17-20, Mainz), which is interpreted by Moscow as the USA's refusal to continue the dialogue in this sphere. Moscow's sensitive reaction is also connected with Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Admiral J. Winnefeld's report at the Conference on missile defense within the framework of the Atlantic Council of the United States (Washington, May 28), which addressed the following aspects:

improving the efficiency of anti-missile defense — while the work to improve the performance characteristics of missile equipment continues. The most promising are: ABM complexes THAAD (efficiency of about 100 %); ship missile complexes “Aegis BMD” (86 %); ADMS “Patriot” PAC-3 (84 %);
building up the US missile defense system by deploying by 2017 of additional 14 silo-based missiles GBI (50 %) on the basis of the ABM Fort Greely (Alaska);
strengthening regional missile defense systems in Europe: deployment by 2015 of ground-based missile defense systems “Aegis Ashor” in Romania, by 2018 — in Poland, as well as deployment by the end of 2015 at the naval base in Rota (Spain) of four destroyers of the US Navy with interceptor missiles SM-3 type; with the Gulf countries: United Arab Emirates — acquisition of complexes THAAD; Kuwait — supply of ADMS “Patriot” PAC-3; Saudi Arabia — modernization of ADMS “Patriot” PAC-2 to the PAC-3 level; Israel — joint development of complexes “Arrow”, “David's Sling”, “Iron Dome”.

Besides, due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Canada decided to join the US anti-missile defense.

Russia is urging CSTO member countries to create a unified system of Air and Missile Defense

In response, Russia is urging CSTO member countries to create a unified system of Air and Missile Defense; in April-May in the Arctic (region of Novosibirsk Islands) Russia tested three “Pantsyr-S” air-defence missile-gun system; within the framework of large-scale trainings the RF Armed Forces in May launched intercontinental ballistic missiles “Topol”; and the RF also decided to sell to China S-400 “Triumph” ADMS, together with its comprehensive technical documentation.

In the second half of this year, Poland is planning to launch a tender for the purchase of medium-range Air and Missile Defense system, including six batteries of medium-range ADMS “WISŁA”. In the tender worth about 8 billion US dollars participate the French consortium “Thales”, European group MBDA, a Polish state-owned company, the Government of Israel, US companies “Raytheon” and “Lockheed Martin”, as well as the consortium MEADS.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has tested new types of radar and missile equipment in the Persian Gulf on the Kish Island, including anti-aircraft missiles, radars and artillery command and control systems “Basir” and “Matla-ul-Fajr” radar system.

2.6 The Iranian nuclear issue

In 2014, the situation around “Iran's nuclear program” had a real chance to be normalized and Iran could go out of the international isolation. In such a scenario, first of all, were interested the USA and EU, as it would have allowed:

to free up the USA's military and political resources for solving strategic tasks in other regions of the world (including strategic competition with China and the issue of North Korea);
to go in cooperation with Iran to resolving the Syrian crisis;
to change the configuration of forces in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Israel will be forced to compromise with the Arab world, especially with Saudi Arabia, for the sake of balancing Iran);
to influence the world energy market (which will contribute to lowering the prices, promotion of the Southern Energy Corridor in order to reduce the EU's dependence on Russian energy resources).

However, Ayatollah Khamenei decided to change Iran's position in the negotiations with the “international six” which made impossible the signing of a comprehensive agreement on Tehran's nuclear program by July 20 and continuation of consultations till November 25. At this, the G5+1 had agreed to unfreeze for Tehran 2.8 billion US dollars in exchange for the Iranian side's finishing of processing of stockpiles of enriched uranium to 20 %.

At this stage of the negotiation process, the United States put forward the following requirements to Iran:

replacement of the heavy water reactor at Arak with a light water reactors;
Tehran's signing additional protocols under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to ensure international control over the activities of certain Iranian nuclear facilities;
suspension of uranium enrichment at the nuclear facility in Fordo and organization on the specified object of research activities in the sphere of implementation of projects for development of “peaceful atom”;
limiting the development of Iran's missile programs. Under the action of this demand gets production of missiles of “Sajjil”, “Safir”, “Simorgh”, “Shahab-4”, “Ashura” and “Ashura-1” class.

It should be noted that the Russian Foreign Ministry called Washington's position “tactic of putting forward new requirements”, since the question of Iran's missile programs had never been on the agenda of negotiations with the “International Six”. Besides, trying to warn the international community against imposing sanctions on Russia because of the Malaysian aircraft downed in the Donbas, Moscow sent the following signals:

Russia may exit the regime of sanctions against Iran and fulfill the contract on supplying Tehran with systems S-300;
Iran's accession to SCO or BRICS will be a powerful factor in strengthening the anti-American bloc;
at the moment, Russia and Iran are preparing a broad bilateral agreement on cooperation in the economic, energy and military spheres.

2.7 Worsening of the situation in the Asia-Pacific Region

In the first half of this year there continued worsening of global competition in the Asia-Pacific region between the major world powers, in particular, between the United States and its allies in the region on the one hand, and China and Russia — on the other. It is obvious that a certain precedent was established by Russia, through its annexation of the Crimea and supporting the escalation of tensions in the east of Ukraine.

In the Asia-Pacific Region, the greatest tension is noted in the relationship between China and Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao), as well as in the conflict of interests in the South China Sea between China, the Philippines and Vietnam (Paracel Islands). In this context, one cannot help noticing the deterioration of relations between Beijing and Hanoi in May after the incident with drowning in the South China Sea of a Vietnamese fishing boat and placing by the Chinese side of the “Haiyang Shiyu-981” oil rig, accompanied by warships near the disputed islands.

At the same time, the probability of a full-scale war is insignificant in view of the serious economic relations (China is Vietnam's largest trading partner with an annual turnover of 50 billion US dollars). In case of aggravation of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, Hanoi will have to seek assistance of third countries, in particular, of the United States and Japan, which are China's main rivals in the region. Unlike Moscow, recently undertaking extensive economic and military-technical expansion in this country, but not wanting to risk its relations with Beijing, Washington has expressed willingness to support the countries of the region in territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea by both, its military presence, and by assisting partners in filing legal claims to international institutions about China's wrongfulness.

In order to limit the USA's influence in the region, the Governments of China and Russia are working on a program of general military and political strategy for the period 2015-2020. Besides, there is an improvement of Russia's relations with Pakistan in the sphere of military-technical cooperation that could eventually lead to creation of an “Asian strategic axis” Beijing-Islamabad-Moscow.

Taking into consideration the worsening of relations in the Asia-Pacific Region and the European Union's intention to maintain its own interests in the region, the EU institutions have begun consultations on the development of a common and coordinated position of the EU for urgent issues on the agenda of the Asian and Asia-Pacific Regions. The EU intends to strengthen regional integration, in particular, building upon the work of ASEAN, and to promote activities in the field of conflict prevention and mediation to determine the role of the European Union as a partner in dealing with global challenges in the security sphere.

So,in the short andmedium term,the situationin the region willbe shaped bythe following factors:

1. Renewal of the US military presencein the Pacific Ocean in accordance with the started in 2010 policy of “containment of China”. As part of this, the US government has started the construction of a naval base in Singapore and has begun negotiations with Vietnam on a strategic partnership. Besides, with South Korea is being discussed a possible return to the peninsula of tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, the USA will use seismic, sonar and infrared observation stations (located in Australia, New Zealand and Japan) to monitor the PRC's strategic nuclear forces.

2. China's attempts to gradually upgrade its nuclear forces through the development of new intercontinental ballistic missiles with modern systems to overcome missile defense, as well as a new type of nuclear-powered submarines. At the same time, without Russia's technological assistance China won't be able to solve the above-mentioned problems.

3. Impact of the situation on the Korean peninsula on Japan's military policy.

In particular, because of the threat from North Korea, Japan has bought new US missile defense systems, the use of which may be considered as a precedent of Japan's use of weapons outside the archipelago.

4. The uncertainty in the region in issues of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Republic of Korea and Japan's governments for several years already have been discussing the feasibility of having nuclear weapons. Thus, it is quite possible that the governments of these countries may decide to withdraw from the NPT and start developing their own nuclear weapons, despite the United States' disapproval (theoretical and practical potential will allow both sides to begin developments in this sphere).

5. Preservation of uncertainty about the future of nuclear power industry in Japan, China and South Korea. The accident at the Fukushima refute compensation of the lack of energy using coal power plants and export of LNG. Japanese nuclear power plants produce 30 % of the energy, in the Republic of Kazakhstan — 45 %, in China — up to 6 %. The governments of these countries are going to increase the use of nuclear power by the introduction of new reactors.

2.8 The outbreak of Ebola

Against the background of escalating military-political threats, development of ethnic and religious conflicts, worsening territorial disputes, has arisen an epidemiological challenge for the whole community in the form of outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, first of all in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Nigeria. By mid-August 2014, the virus has killed more than 1 thousand people. In these states has been announced a state of emergency, the neighboring states restrict movement across the borders, some airlines have canceled their flights.

In the situation of actual pandemic disease, the Committee of the World Health Organization (WHO) has come to a consensus on the use of non-certified medicines, including “ZMapp”, the effect and side effects of which has not been fully studied. WHO has not introduce a quarantine in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria (so as not to worsen their economic situation), but the Organization demands from governments of these states to take immediate measures, in particular, thorough check of passengers at international airports, sea ports and border crossings (questionnaires and the temperature scan) with isolation for 31 days (including the 21-day incubation period of the virus) of anyone suspected of infection.

In this situation, China has provided Liberia and Sierra Leone with humanitarian aid worth 5 million US dollars (medical equipment, disinfectants, clothes for medical staff). Canada has passed over a few tens of doses of vaccine that has been studied only in monkeys. The European Union has decided to increase by € 8 million the aid to fight the epidemic of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in West Africa and to develop a second mobile laboratory for diagnosing the disease (the first laboratory began its work in late March in Guinea).

Possible threats of Ukrainian citizens' catching this dangerous virus exist when they visit the countries (tourism, business trips), in which outbreak of Ebola has been recorded.

3. General conclusions and forecasts of the development of events

1. Russia's annexation of the Crimea and further implementation of tactics of the “remote war” against Ukraine have provoked a serious crisis of European and international security system, having demonstrated its ineffectiveness, and the illusory nature of the security guarantees provided in due time to non-aligned states. At this, in the medium term, the Russian Federation will be the main source of threat to the national security of Ukraine.

2. The priority direction of the policy of the Russian Federation until the end of the year will be ensuring international recognition of the annexation of the Crimea with simultaneous militarization of the Peninsular and its transformation into a military outpost of Russia in the Black Sea region, as well as further support for terrorists in the eastern regions of Ukraine (weapons and military equipment, soldiers). Concentrated in the border areas military capability and assets of the Russian Federation are insufficient for a full-scale military intervention, but they can be used for organization of a “peacekeeping mission”.

At the same time, the Russian Federation will take steps to accelerate the economic and financial exhaustion of Ukraine: stopping the economy in the east, opposition to reversal of gas from Europe, various economic sanctions, a new wave of information warfare, formation of new “humanitarian convoys” to the east of Ukraine, strengthening the information war against Western countries.

1. At the present stage, neither NATO and the United States on the one hand, nor Russia — on the other hand, are interested in opposition's turning into an open military confrontation. The above-mentioned limits opportunities for Ukraine to get direct and sufficient in terms of volumes, military assistance from the Alliance (for fear of provoking Russia's inadequate response), and will also make impossible Ukraine's joining NATO.

2. The main leaders of implementation of conclusions of the September NATO Summit are the USA, the UK, the Baltic countries as well as Poland and Romania. At the same time, the effectiveness of such measures will be restrained by the passive attitude of other Member States, uninterested in strengthening confrontation with Russia (for economic reasons included) and preferring diplomatic and political options for resolving the situation. Similar problems will occur in the context of improving the EU CSDP.

3. In the modern realities of the RF's strategy on former Soviet territories, there exists a significant possibility that another potential target of the aggressive policy of the Kremlin will be Moldova. In this context, there is now a revitalization of the Russian special services in the Moldovan direction which fact may mean a possibility of repeating the scenario of the "Donbas separatism”, particularly in Gagauzia.

4. The strategic goal of Russia's aggressive policy is the return of the lost (as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union) status of a world leader, as well as ensuring the recognition by the West of the Russian zone of strategic interests, development of cooperation with the states of which should be agreed with Moscow.

5. In its attempt to form a so-called “anti-American bloc”, Russia meets new problems that can affect Moscow's authority and its geopolitical position as a whole. Thus, within the framework of a search for compromise with Beijing, Moscow did not react to the territorial dispute between China and Vietnam. Such Russia's self-disengagement caused a negative reaction of the official Hanoi, which henceforth will link guarantees of the territorial integrity of Vietnam with the restoration of functioning on its territory of the Naval Base of the USA.

Besides, in the situation of the imposed by the EU sanctions, Russia's reorientation to the Asian market will be the aggravation factor in the competition on it between Russian manufacturers and traditional suppliers who are predominantly members of the SCO and BRICS, which, in turn, will neutralize Moscow's “ideological efforts”. Under such circumstances, Tehran will try to keep to itself a space to maneuver, leaving a chance for the successful completion of negotiations with the international community on Iran's nuclear program and a chance “not to slide” into the format of bloc confrontation, in which the Iranian side would act on the sidelines.

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[1] The MNNA Status does not provide for mutual defense guarantees from the United States, but allows full military and military-technical cooperation with NATO countries and other states that have the specified status, and use most of the privileges of NATO member countries. At present, the status of MNNA has been granted to 15 States, in particular Australia, Israel, Jordan, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan.

[2] The EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) was established on the 22 July 2014, and finally has to be formed no later than 30 November (the period for which has been allocated the initial funding of 2.6 million Euros). The pre-task of the Mission is to help the Ukrainian side in the reform of law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Kalman Mizsei’s appointment as Head of the Mission may indicate additional interest of foreigners to the problems of ensuring the rule of law, transparency, and struggle against corruption. Central office of the EUAM Ukraine will include 40 EU experts, who will coordinate the work of the employed Ukrainian citizens. Each regional office (probably in Kharkiv, Odesa and Lviv) will include 10 experts. To implement training programs can be involved up to 10 additional experts.